Getting to Yes: Chapter 4 Summary & Analysis

Negotiations often entail opposed interests when they involve one-dimensional factors (like the price of something) or an either/or decision. But negotiators can circumvent these problems by inventing creative solutions to their problems. When they do not, they end up unable to agree or settling for less-than-ideal agreements.

The authors offer a “diagnosis” of why people fail to consider creative solutions that do not lie on “a straight line between their position and yours.” They suggest four main reasons. The first is “premature judgment”: people are not used to inventing new ideas, and when they start to, they often let the critical voices in their head talk them out of thinking creatively. Similarly, if the other parties to the negotiation are likely to interpret a negotiator’s creative brainstorming as a concrete proposal, it can be dangerous to invent new options.

The second barrier to creative solutions is “searching for the single answer,” or insisting on narrowing down the range of possible solutions from the beginning instead of being willing to expand it. The third problem is “the assumption of a fixed pie,” when one party’s gain seems to require the other party to lose. And the fourth and final problem is “thinking that ‘solving their problem is their problem,’” or refusing to try and satisfy the other side’s interests in addition to one’s own self-interest.

Next, the authors offer a four-part “prescription” for negotiators who are having trouble inventing options. First, they should “separate inventing from deciding” by creating dedicated time and space for brainstorming. In a brainstorming session, people only invent ideas—they do not evaluate them yet. By deliberately removing inhibitions, brainstorming sessions incentivize people to come up with new, bold ideas but shield them from embarrassment.

The authors explain how to run a brainstorming session, which should ideally be small (five to eight people) and informal. Participants should sit side-by-side (which promotes cooperation), and facilitators should stop criticism and record the group’s ideas somewhere everyone can see. After the brainstorming, the group should open itself to limited constructive criticism, select the best few ideas, and take one shot at improving them before planning a subsequent meeting to actually choose which options to present at the negotiation.

The authors note that both sides can try to brainstorm together. While this can be risky, it can often produce excellent solutions and improve negotiators’ relationships. But during this process, negotiators should emphasize that they’re not making proposals. The authors give an example of a successful negotiation between a labor union and a group of corporate managers. They point out that the discussion largely consists of open-ended questions rather than definite positions and assertions.

The second subheading in the authors’ “prescription” is to “broaden your options.” They emphasize that brainstorming is not necessarily about searching for the best answer—rather, it is about getting different ideas together in order to give oneself more good options that can be taken into the negotiation later on.

Using “The Circle Chart,” the authors show how a four-step thinking process can solve problems. First, people should identify the specific problem they want to address. Then, they should generally analyze the situation that has created the problem. Thirdly, they should generally consider what solving the problems in the overall situation requires. And finally, they should define realistic solutions and plans for pursuing them. 

The Circle Chart is specifically useful because it helps people develop new ideas that are related to the first action plans they create, in content or in theory. As an example, the authors explain how a proposal to create common history books for Catholic and protestant students in Northern Ireland eventually led to several related ideas, like changing the way history was taught or creating an exchange program for teachers. Some of these even came to fruition.

The authors also suggest that problem-solvers imagine the perspectives that different kinds of experts would take on their problem. Before negotiations, it can help to be ready with options for “‘weaker’ versions” of one’s plans, in case the parties cannot agree on a final solution. In this kind of situation, the parties can still agree on smaller steps—for instance, they can appoint an arbitrator or clearly establish their points of disagreement. Additionally, they can break the problem into smaller steps, agree on a plan for part of it, and then move forward a little bit at a time.

The third section of the authors’ “prescription” is to “look for mutual gain,” which can be useful in situations that appear to be zero-sum. In reality, situations are almost never zero-sum. It is always possible for both parties to lose or to win a helpful relationship. And creative solutions can often create mutual-win scenarios that might not be apparent at first. The key to finding these solutions is to determine what interests both parties have in common.

For instance, imagine a mayor who wants an oil company to pay higher taxes. The mayor’s primary interest is getting necessary tax money, and the oil executive’s is expanding operations to increase profit. So both parties care about expanding production and investment in the city. They could agree on various tax breaks for business, which could encourage more investment and presumably give the city more revenue. But if they do not reach an agreement, the worsened relationship between the local government and the company could harm both of them. Thus, each party’s success also benefits the other party.

All negotiations include some shared interests, like the interest in future cooperation. But negotiators have to actually identify and act on these shared interests—the first step is turning them into concrete shared goals. By pointing these interests out, the quality of negotiation improves, too.

It is also possible to “dovetail differing interests,” or create solutions that satisfy both side’s interests, when they do not conflict. The authors present a list of examples, like if one party wants to control the form of a message and the other the substance of it. This kind of compromise can also resolve differing beliefs, predictions, and attitudes toward time or risk. One strategy to find dovetailing opportunities is to propose various alternatives that meet one’s own needs equally, but may be better or worse for the other side. This lets the other side reveal what they actually care about. In a nutshell, dovetailing essentially means agreeing to things that hugely improve the deal for one side but do not worsen it for the other.

The authors’ final tip for inventing creative decisions is to “make their decision easy.” It helps to think about the other negotiator not as a faceless representative, but rather as an individual considering many different factors (like constituents’ interests and their professional reputation).

To make an agreement easier to accept, negotiators should eliminate uncertainty by presenting specific proposals and defining mutually acceptable terms early on. It is much easier and lower-risk to agree to solutions that are easy to implement, legitimate, and consistent with precedent. And offers yield solutions much more easily than threats do. To evaluate how appealing any given proposal is for the other side, it helps to imagine how their negotiator would be criticized if they accepted it. Ideal proposals are “yesable,” meaning that the other side can realistically agree to them on the spot.