How Democracies Die

Alberto Fujimori never intended to rule Peru—in 1990, he only he ran for president to win name recognition for his independent senate campaign. Facing hyperinflation and a guerrilla insurgency, however, the public rebelled against the political establishment. They elected Fujimori, an inexperienced populist outsider, over the Nobel Prize-winning novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. When he took office, Fujimori faced an opposition-run congress and a skeptical media. He started publicly insulting his enemies, ruling through executive decrees, and pardoning thousands of prisoners. When the courts pushed back against Fujimori and congress tried to oust him, Fujimori disbanded congress and suspended the constitution instead.

Fujimori’s story shows that “democratic breakdown doesn’t need a blueprint.” Instead, it’s often the result of gradually escalating tensions between a leader and the establishment. These tensions often start with insults and accusations, which then escalate to desperate actions. For instance, Juan Perón and Hugo Chávez’s opposition tried to get them out of power by any means necessary, and they escalated tensions in response. Authoritarians also tend to dislike the endless compromises, criticism, and checks and balances that come with governing a democracy.

Elected demagogues tend to start attacking democratic institutions slowly, through a series of minor steps that seem legal or legitimate. Levitsky and Ziblatt compare this to how a soccer team might try to rig a game: they would win over the referees, incapacitate key players on the other team, and change the rules to their advantage.

First, like the soccer team would try to win over the referees, authoritarians try to take control of agencies that are supposed to be “neutral arbiters,” like the courts, law enforcement, and regulators. This protects them from punishment and gives them a powerful weapon to use against their opponents. For instance, Viktor Orbán fired independent regulatory officials and hired allies instead. Alberto Fujimori’s advisor Vladimiro Montesinos bribed and blackmailed hundreds of opposition figures. Juan Perón, Viktor Orbán, the Polish Law and Justice Party, and Hugo Chávez all restructured their countries’ supreme courts to their favor.

Next, like the cheating soccer team, autocrats try to sideline their opponents. Bribes and favors are often the easiest way to win over the opposition. For instance, Vladimiro Montesinos paid off every major Peruvian TV channel, and in exchange, they let him plan the nightly news. He also bribed opposition politicians to support Fujimori’s illegal reelection effort and switch sides to give Fujimori a majority in congress.

When bribes and favors fail, autocrats look to incapacitate their opponents, whether in politics, the media, business, or popular culture. They can’t kill opponents anymore, but they often can attack them through the law. Juan Perón, Hugo Chávez, and the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed all got opposition leaders arrested on dubious charges. Rafael Correa, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Vladimir Putin, and Chávez all crushed opposition media through fines and lawsuits, leaving them open for government takeover. Putin and Erdoğan investigated, audited, and fined wealthy businessmen who support the opposition. Perón got the iconic writer Jorge Luis Borges fired and blacklisted after he criticized the government, while Chávez funded cultural figures like the conductor Gustavo Dudamel to prevent them from speaking out against the regime. By silencing prominent opposition figures, autocrats convince everyone in the opposition to give up.

Finally, like the cheating soccer team, authoritarians try to rewrite the rules for their own benefit. They change procedures and institutions to protect their power, while claiming to just be improving democracy. For instance, Malaysia’s ruling UMNO party secured the vast majority of parliamentary seats through gerrymandering, and Viktor Orbán changed election laws to ensure that all political advertising ran on his government’s broadcast station. In fact, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the worst example of such antidemocratic election laws is the Southern U.S. after the Civil War. Every Southern state passed discriminatory laws to prevent Black people from voting and lock in single-party white supremacist rule.

Ironically, while they dismantle democracy bit by bit, authoritarians frequently claim to be defending it—especially during crises. For instance, after an unexplained bombing in 1972, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declared that martial law was necessary to protect democracy. (He went on to rule as a dictator for fourteen years.)

Crises generally help governments concentrate and abuse power by encouraging citizens to “rally ‘round the flag.” This happened in the U.S. after 9/11, when President George W. Bush became incredibly popular and started restricting civil liberties. In crises, the public tends to tolerate authoritarian policies and constitutions tend to give executives special emergency powers. Therefore, demagogues seek out crises in order to rig the government in their favor. Fujimori justified his 1992 coup d’état by pointing to the guerrilla insurgency, and Marcos likely orchestrated the very bombing that he used to justify imposing martial law.

Most famously, when the Reichstag (German parliament building) burned down in 1933, Adolf Hitler used his emergency powers to eliminate the Nazis’ opposition and rule Germany by decree for more than a decade. Similarly, when Vladimir Putin became Russia’s prime minister in 1999, he used a series of alleged terrorist attacks on Moscow to justify invading the region of Chechnya, consolidating power, and attacking the opposition. In fact, many historians believe that the Nazis started the Reichstag fire and Putin’s government planned the attacks on Moscow. Similarly, in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used ISIS terror attacks and a 2016 coup attempt to justify calling emergency elections and cracking down on thousands of officials, journalists, and judges.