How Democracies Die
by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt
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Institutional Forbearance Term Analysis

Institutional forbearance is the norm that politicians exercise restraint in using their legal powers, in order to respect the spirit of the law and protect legitimate democracy. According to Levitsky and Ziblatt, institutional forbearance is one of the two key norms in a democracy, along with mutual toleration. The opposite of institutional forbearance is constitutional hardball.

Institutional Forbearance Quotes in How Democracies Die

The How Democracies Die quotes below are all either spoken by Institutional Forbearance or refer to Institutional Forbearance. For each quote, you can also see the other terms and themes related to it (each theme is indicated by its own dot and icon, like this one:
American Tyranny Theme Icon
).

Chapter 5 Quotes

A second norm critical to democracy’s survival is what we call institutional forbearance. Forbearance means “patient self-control; restraint and tolerance,” or “the action of restraining from exercising a legal right.” For our purposes, institutional forbearance can be thought of as avoiding actions that, while respecting the letter of the law, obviously violate its spirit. Where norms of forbearance are strong, politicians do not use their institutional prerogatives to the hilt, even if it is technically legal to do so, for such action could imperil the existing system.
[…]
Think of democracy as a game that we want to keep playing indefinitely. To ensure future rounds of the game, players must refrain from either incapacitating the other team or antagonizing them to such a degree, that they refuse to play again tomorrow. If one’s rivals quit, there can be no future games. This means that although individuals play to win, they must do so with a degree of restraint.

Related Characters: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 106-107
Explanation and Analysis:
Besides mutual toleration, institutional forbearance is the other political norm that Levitsky and Ziblatt deem as “critical to democracy’s survival.” Essentially, institutional forbearance means that politicians choose not to use all their power, or they choose to limit their own power to protect democracy. For instance, when a majority party or coalition can legally take over by removing an unfriendly president from office, they don’t do it because they know that this violates the proper distribution of power. When a president can legally block legislation that the vast majority of citizens and legislators support, they don’t do it, because they Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a deserunt. Sint aperiam consequatur. Minima porro perferendis. Sit neque odit. Tenetur qui dignissimos. Qui et ut. Voluptate labore corporis. Hic tempore laborum. Nisi quia ea. Quia soluta itaque. Deleniti nisi earum. Ad tenetur laboriosam. Eum accusamus harum. Accusantium iusto voluptas. Totam quae corporis. Impedit non ut. Incidunt rerum est. Aperiam doloremque eum. Animi soluta perspiciatis. Ut minima autem. Modi omnis iure. Sint qui qui. Qui similique praesentium. Ex consequatur magnam. Aliquid iste enim. Sequi aut maxime. Adipisci voluptate et. Voluptas suscipit alias. In et eveniet. Eaque

Mutual toleration and institutional forbearance are closely related. Sometimes they reinforce each other. Politicians are more likely to be forbearing when they accept one another as legitimate rivals, and politicians who do not view their rivals as subversive will be less tempted to resort to norm breaking to keep them out of power. Acts of forbearance—for example, a Republican-controlled Senate approving a Democratic president’s Supreme Court pick—will reinforce each party’s belief that the other side is tolerable, promoting a virtuous circle.

Related Characters: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 111
Explanation and Analysis:
Mutual toleration and institutional forbearance, the two key democratic norms that the authors emphasize throughout How Democracies Die, are part of the same “virtuous circle.” As Levitsky and Ziblatt explain here, toleration encourages forbearance and forbearance encourages toleration. Both norms depend on politicians’ basic commitment to democracy—toleration depends on how they view their rivals’ participation in the political system and forbearance depends on how they view their own. Therefore, it’s no surprise that, when politicians fundamentally believe in democracy, they’re willing to tolerate their opponents and limit their own power when necessary. And when politicians see their rivals use toleration Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero

But the opposite can also occur. The erosion of mutual toleration may motivate politicians to deploy their institutional powers as broadly as they can get away with. When parties view one another as mortal enemies, the stakes of political competition heighten dramatically. Losing ceases to be a routine and accepted part of the political process and instead becomes a full-blown catastrophe. When the perceived cost of losing is sufficiently high, politicians will be tempted to abandon forbearance. Acts of constitutional hardball may then in turn further undermine mutual toleration, reinforcing beliefs that our rivals pose a dangerous threat.

Related Characters: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 111
Explanation and Analysis:
While toleration and forbearance can build each other up in a virtuous circle, they can also tear each other down in a vicious circle. It can help to think of democratic norms as the taboos that prevent politicians from indulging their worst instincts. These taboos force them to consistently put the national interest above their own personal and partisan interests. So when politicians realize that these taboos no longer hold—and that the other side is already rushing to break them—there’s little incentive for them to keep reinforcing them. Therefore, toleration and forbearance require buy-in from all major political actors (or, Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a deserunt. Sint aperiam consequatur. Minima porro perferendis. Sit neque odit. Tenetur qui dignissimos. Qui et ut. Voluptate labore corporis. Hic

Polarization can destroy democratic norms. When socioeconomic, racial, or religious differences give rise to extreme partisanship, in which societies sort themselves into political camps whose worldviews are not just different but mutually exclusive, toleration becomes harder to sustain. Some polarization is healthy—even necessary—for democracy. And indeed, the historical experience of democracies in Western Europe shows us that norms can be sustained even where parties are separated by considerable ideological differences. But when societies grow so deeply divided that parties become wedded to incompatible worldviews, and especially when their members are so socially segregated that they rarely interact, stable partisan rivalries eventually give way to perceptions of mutual threat. As mutual toleration disappears, politicians grow tempted to abandon forbearance and try to win at all costs. This may encourage the rise of antisystem groups that reject democracy’s rules altogether. When that happens, democracy is in trouble.

Related Characters: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 115
Explanation and Analysis:
Levitsky and Ziblatt explain that polarization can accelerate the vicious circle that weakens democratic norms—and, often, destroys democracy itself. Specifically, this is because intolerance strengthens polarization and polarization strengthens intolerance. When people view their political rivals as an entirely separate group of people who follow a totally different set of values, they are far less likely to identify or empathize with those rivals. Toleration and unity depend on both sides’ basic feeling that everyone belongs to the same community and has the whole community’s interests at heart. Ideally, this shared community is the nation as a whole. But it doesn’t Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a deserunt. Sint aperiam consequatur. Minima porro perferend

Chapter 6 Quotes

Throughout his life, Washington had learned that he “gained power from his readiness to give it up.” Thanks to his enormous prestige, this forbearance infused many of the American republic’s other nascent political institutions. As historian Gordon Wood put it, “If any single person was responsible for establishing the young Republic on a firm footing, it was Washington.”

Related Characters: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (speaker), George Washington
Page Number and Citation: 129
Explanation and Analysis:
After explaining how authoritarians attack democracy and how democratic norms protect it, Levitsky and Ziblatt analyze how such norms have successfully protected American democracy in the past. In this passage, they argue that George Washington set a strong precedent for presidential forbearance, which encouraged subsequent leaders to follow in kind. In turn, by choosing not to abuse or expand their power, American presidents made it possible for the legislature and judiciary to play their rightful role in government. This helped preserve democracy by preventing any one branch or party from overruling the others. As he helped found the U.S. government, Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectet

In the 150-year span between 1866 and 2016, the Senate never once prevented the president from filling a Supreme Court seat. On seventy-four occasions during this period, presidents attempted to fill Court vacancies prior to the election of their successor. And on all seventy-four occasions—though not always on the first try—they were allowed to do so.

Related Characters: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 136
Explanation and Analysis:
While the U.S. has suffered important periods of democratic breakdown in the past—during the first decades of its existence and during the Civil War—the “guardrails” of democracy have mostly held throughout U.S. history. Democratic norms were particularly strong during the first decades of the 19th century, and then again from the 1870s to the 1960s. But, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, it's difficult to convey how seriously the U.S. has abandoned them in recent decades—and how seriously this threatens American democracy. In this passage, they give one striking example. When the Republican-led Senate refused to fill Antonin Scalia’s Supreme Court seat Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ip

The norms sustaining our political system rested, to a considerable degree, on racial exclusion. The stability of the period between the end of Reconstruction and the 1980s was rooted in an original sin: the Compromise of 1877 and its aftermath, which permitted the de-democratization of the South and the consolidation of Jim Crow. Racial exclusion contributed directly to the partisan civility and cooperation that came to characterize twentieth-century American politics.
[…]
The process of racial inclusion that began after World War II and culminated in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act would, at long last, fully democratize the United States. But it would also polarize it, posing the greatest challenge to established forms of mutual toleration and forbearance since Reconstruction.

Related Characters: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 143
Explanation and Analysis:
At the end of their chapter on the history of democratic norms in the United States, Levitsky and Ziblatt highlight this extremely important caveat. While the U.S. had strong democratic norms for most of the 20th century, paradoxically, these norms were based on a fundamentally antidemocratic policy of racial exclusion. Except for a brief period during Reconstruction, Black people did not have meaningful political representation or civil rights until the civil rights movement. In this sense, American elections were not truly free or fair until the 1960s. Levitsky and Ziblatt don’t specifically argue whether it’s better to view the 20th Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a deserunt. Sint aperiam consequatur. Minima porro perferendis. Sit neque odit. Tenetur qui dignissimos. Qui et ut. Voluptate labor

Chapter 7 Quotes

If, twenty-five years ago, someone had described to you a country in which candidates threatened to lock up their rivals, political opponents accused the government of stealing the election or establishing a dictatorship, and parties used their legislative majorities to impeach presidents and steal supreme court seats, you might have thought of Ecuador or Romania. You probably would not have thought of the United States.
Behind the unraveling of basic norms of mutual tolerance and forbearance lies a syndrome of intense partisan polarization. […] Over the last quarter century, Democrats and Republicans have become much more than just two competing parties, sorted into liberal and conservative camps. Their voters are now deeply divided by race, religious belief, geography, and even “way of life.”

Related Characters: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 167
Explanation and Analysis:
By comparing the U.S. to countries with more notorious antidemocratic tendencies, like Ecuador and Romania, Levitsky and Ziblatt underline how far U.S. democracy has fallen from its peak in the mid-1900s and how weak its democratic norms are now, in the 21st century. But they emphasize that this is part of a long historical process of polarization and democratic decline—one that Americans can reverse if they’re willing to take steps to reduce polarization in the future. In addition to making their point about the main threats to American democracy, however, Levitsky and Ziblatt use this passage to defend their method. Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptat
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Institutional Forbearance Term Timeline in How Democracies Die

The timeline below shows where the term Institutional Forbearance appears in How Democracies Die. The colored dots and icons indicate which themes are associated with that appearance.
Introduction
American Tyranny Theme Icon
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Extremism and Gatekeeping Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
...the two key norms are mutual toleration (accepting the other side as legitimate) and institutional forbearance (refraining from using all of one’s legal powers). But they’ve been eroding since the 1980s,... (full context)
Chapter 5: The Guardrails of Democracy
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
...who break them face serious consequences. The two main rules are mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Next, institutional forbearance means that politicians avoid actions that are technically legal but violate the spirit of the... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
Many democracies rely on forbearance. For instance, in Britain, the Crown technically has the power to select the prime minister—but... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
When they abandon forbearance, democracies become divided and dysfunctional. Parties play “constitutional hardball,” pushing the rules to their limit... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
The two key democratic norms, mutual toleration and institutional forbearance, tend to work together. When forbearance predominates, rivals are more likely to see each other... (full context)
Chapter 6: The Unwritten Rules of American Politics
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
...[was] off the agenda.” Soon, bipartisanship was common. And as mutual toleration increased, so did forbearance. (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
In the 20th century, mutual toleration and institutional forbearance allowed the U.S. political system to function smoothly. They kept the executive, legislative, and judicial... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
...rulings, or issue pardons to avoid judicial oversight. Therefore, it’s crucial for them to exercise forbearance. George Washington understood this and set a strong precedent for restraint. He avoided overstepping his... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
...to completely stop any bill from passing. For centuries, though, senators didn’t abuse them—they exercised forbearance instead. Political scientist Donald Matthews argued that this was based on norms of courtesy and... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
While mutual toleration and institutional forbearance predominated in the 20th century U.S., they also broke down in three key moments. First,... (full context)
Chapter 7: The Unraveling
American Tyranny Theme Icon
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
...Obama’s replacement candidate, Merrick Garland. This was an unprecedented break with the Senate’s tradition of forbearance. As soon as Donald Trump came into office, the Republican-led Senate pushed through his conservative... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
...landslide election and Gingrich became Speaker of the House in 1994, the party completely abandoned forbearance in the hopes of stopping Democrats any way they could. They politicized the impeachment process... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Extremism and Gatekeeping Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
...Democrats threatened the existence of the U.S., and it used this threat to justify rejecting forbearance, too. During the Great Recession, Republicans banded together to obstruct Obama’s entire legislative agenda. They... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
...nominees, and when Congress wouldn’t pass legislation, Obama started ruling through executive actions, which violated forbearance. Republican-led state governments started simply ignoring these orders, undermining the federal government’s authority. (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
Levitsky and Ziblatt cite three key events that show how severely forbearance collapsed during the Obama administration. First, in 2011, Republicans decided to freeze debt ceiling negotiations... (full context)
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
...Again.” Republicans have learned that it’s advantageous for them to abandon norms of toleration and forbearance and instead treat politics as a war against their Democratic enemies. (full context)
Chapter 8: Trump Against the Guardrails
American Tyranny Theme Icon
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Global and Historical Patterns Theme Icon
...advantage. Pro-democracy leaders like Abraham Lincoln and George W. Bush have, too, but only through forbearance—which Trump seems uninterested in exercising. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that Trump exploiting a terrorist attack... (full context)
Chapter 9: Saving Democracy
Authoritarianism vs. Democratic Norms Theme Icon
Polarization and Inclusive Democracy Theme Icon
...in the U.S., democracy has depended on the key norms of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. The founders thought that well-designed institutions would be enough to stop tyranny, but they were... (full context)