One of Thomas Hobbes’s central arguments in Leviathan is that people moved out of nature and into civil societies to establish a common power. Building on that argument, Hobbes outlines the ways in which a common power is established and maintained. When creating a common power, any number of people enter into a contract, or covenant, in which they agree to forfeit their right to self-preservation and give that right to a single person or group of people. This union of people joined under a single power is known as a common-wealth. If the power of a common-wealth is given to a single person, a monarchy is created; if the power of a common-wealth is given to a few people, an aristocracy is created; and if the power of a common-wealth is given to a group of people, a democracy is created. While each of these common-wealths are different, they are each imbued with the power of the people and operate to the same end: prioritizing the safety and happiness of the people. Hobbes considers each type of common-wealth and debates the ideal society, which he calls the “great Leviathan,” and he ultimately argues that the best type of common-wealth is a monarchy.
Whether a common-wealth is a democracy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy, each has a common power known as the sovereign, which is endowed with the power of the people to rule over said people and ensure their safety and contentment. According to Hobbes, “from this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.” In other words, in a common-wealth, a group of people agree to give their rights and power to a single entity, which has power in proportion to the number of people in agreement. In a common-wealth, the sovereign power “is judge of what is necessary for the Peace and Defence of his Subjects.” As the subjects of a common-wealth have given up their right to self-preservation, the sovereign power must endeavor for peace and has an obligation to ensure the personal safety of each subject. The sovereign entity has many rights and powers, including the right to make and enforce rules and the power to reward and punish subjects, and these rights are “indivisible.” Sovereign power cannot be forfeited or taken away, and it does not diminish or weaken with time. As long as a common-wealth stands, the sovereign power is absolute and is always derived directly from the people.
While Hobbes outlines multiple types of common-wealths, he ultimately argues that the best common-wealth is a monarchy. In an aristocracy or democracy, Hobbes explains, it is easy for individual members of the sovereign power to increase their “private fortune” at the expense of “publique prosperity.” On the other hand, in a monarchy, “the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects.” In other words, a king or a queen is only as good as their subjects, which motivates a monarch to ensure the best life for their subjects. According to Hobbes, “a Monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates,” whereas a sovereign assembly receives counsel and opinions from only a limited few people and in certain circumstances. In a monarchy, Hobbes thus implies, the people have a better chance of being heard by the sovereign power than they do in a democracy or an aristocracy. Lastly, Hobbes argues that a monarchy is best because people “are subject to no other inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number.” Hobbes maintains that it is human nature to be egocentric and put one’s own needs ahead of others’. In a monarchy, there is only one person potentially putting themselves ahead of the people; in a democracy or an aristocracy, there are more.
Despite Hobbes’s preference for monarchies, he does not pretend that monarchies are a perfect form of civil society. In fact, Hobbes argues that in a monarchy, a single subject “may be deprived of all he possesseth” simply “for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer.” The absolute power of a single person will always be fickle and prone to self-interest because, Hobbes contends, humanity as a whole will always be fickle and prone to self-interest. Hobbes wrote Leviathan in 1651, just a few years into the Interregnum, the period of time in England between the execution of King Charles I and the abolishment of the monarchy in 1649, and the restoration of Charles I’s son, Charles II, to the throne in 1660. During this time, the sovereign power of the common-wealth of England resided with Parliament, an assembly of people, rather than with a single monarch. While Hobbes’s argument was likely a source of controversy in his own time, he clearly supports the monarchy and argues that it is the best type of common-wealth.
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Power, Common-wealths, and Monarchies Quotes in Leviathan
To describe the Nature of the Artificiall man, I will consider
First, the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both
which is Man.
Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is
made; what are the Rights and just Power or
Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that
preserveth and dissolveth it.
Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-wealth.
Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.
For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of delivering up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.
Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind in Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we many honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense.
And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, Insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of Bread in Cheese; or Immateriall Substances; or of A free Subject; A free-Will; or any Free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.
And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.
But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he also made to himself a peculiar Kindgome; and gave Lawes, not only of behavior towards himself; but also towards one another; and thereby in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the Earth; Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation.
For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unlesse a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Alleageance, if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged a Heretique? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of his Subjects?
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For Warre, consisteth not in Battel lonely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: […] All other time is peace.
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak of more particularly, in the two following chapters.
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
Men are freed of their Covenants two ways; by Performing; or by being Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted.
And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath proceeded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.
Fifthly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe.
Now a Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies; Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.
The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.
Of which, this is one, That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes content with lesse Power, that to the Peace, and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required.
To the contrary, I find the Kingdome of God, to signifie in most places of Scripture, a Kingdome properly so named, constituted by the Votes of the People of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for their King by Covenant made with him, upon Gods promising them the possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for Dominion over sinne; (and only in the New Testament;) because such a Dominion as that, every Subject shall have in the Kingdome of God, and without prejudice to the Soveraign.
To this, and such like resemblances between the Papacy, and the Kingdome of Fairies, may be added this, that as the Fairies have no existence, but in the Fancies of ignorant people, rising from the Traditions of old Wives, or old Poets: so the Spirituall Power of the Pope (without the bounds of his own Civil Dominion) consisteth onely in the Fear that Seduced people stand in, of the Excommunication; upon hearing of false Miracles, false Traditions, and false Interpretations of the Scripture.
