Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan is a work of political philosophy, and philosophy in general is a prominent theme within the book. Hobbes argues that all areas of study—politics, poetry, science, and the like—fall under the greater umbrella of philosophy, and he further asserts that all philosophy is rooted in opinion, not in fact. As philosophy is not necessarily rooted in sound reason and fact, it can, according to Hobbes, be completely absurd at times. The exceptions, Hobbes maintains, are geometry and arithmetic, which are grounded in fact and are therefore infallible. Hobbes also makes a third exception to his general rule: for all his talk of philosophy resting on the flimsy foundation of opinion, Hobbes presents his own philosophy as infallible. That Hobbes frames his own philosophy in this light, and that he notes his intention to discount other philosophers, suggests that Hobbes sees his philosophy as being backed by reason and fact. Of course, that Hobbes elevates his own philosophy to the level of geometry and arithmetic may also unintentionally reaffirm his overall argument: that philosophy rests on the flimsy foundation of opinion.
According to Hobbes, (almost) all philosophies are based on opinion, not fact. In explaining the human senses, Hobbes cites Aristotle, who argued that vision and sight are achieved by a “visible species” and hearing is caused by an “audible species.” In short, Aristotle claimed that human beings are able to take in and identify objects both by directly sensing the thing through one of the five senses and by sensing the essence of the thing. Hobbes disagrees. For Hobbes, “the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another.” Hobbes implies that Aristotle’s philosophy is only opinion, and one that is easily dispelled through a more materialist view—that an object is sensed when the thing (not the essence of the thing) comes into direct contact with one of the human sense organs. In Hobbes’s explanation of motion, he claims that an object will remain still forever unless something moves it “is a truth that no man doubts of”—except, of course, for Hobbes. Hobbes argues the opposite, claiming that an object is eternally in motion unless something stops it. This theory of motion is in direct opposition to popular philosophical ideas and theories, which Hobbes thereby implies are merely opinion. Hobbes also explores human imagination and says that certain philosophers claim “that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause.” Hobbes again disagrees. For Hobbes, imagination and thoughts must come from somewhere and are rooted in experience and memory. In other words, Hobbes maintains that one cannot imagine what they haven’t sensed before in some form, either through sight, sound, taste, odor, or touch. Again, Hobbes suggests that many prior philosophies are rooted in opinion, not verifiable fact.
Unlike virtually every other type of philosophy, Hobbes argues that geometry and arithmetic are grounded in fact and are therefore indisputable. He maintains that there is no philosophy other than geometry that begins “ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use.” As geometry does begin with established meanings and explanations, the conclusions drawn are therefore irrefutable. According to Hobbes, if one bases their philosophy on accepted definitions and explanations, it is easy to avoid absurdity. All people “by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles,” Hobbes says. “For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?” Again, unlike other philosophies, geometry and its conclusions are indisputable. When there are indisputable rules for doing any one thing, “as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,” Hobbes argues, “all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule.” Like geometry, “engines” (or machinery) and “edifices (buildings and architecture) are based on arithmetic and fact, not opinion, and they’re beyond contestation.
However, Hobbes also implicitly makes a third exception to the idea that all philosophy is based on opinion, as he presents his own political philosophy as infallible. “The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely,” Hobbes argues. While this may suggest that Hobbes’s philosophy of the ideal society—“the Leviathan”—is therefore rooted in fact, it also may just speak to the idea that philosophy is based on opinion and therefore is disputable. The “certain Rules” of common-wealths that Hobbes defines and explains (for instance, that common-wealths were created to escape the violence and fear of nature, that they rely on covenants and contracts, and that they are best when ruled by a single sovereign monarch) are, after all, just Hobbes’s opinions and are disputed by the very philosophies he rejects.
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Reason, Fact, and Philosophy Quotes in Leviathan
To describe the Nature of the Artificiall man, I will consider
First, the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both
which is Man.
Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is
made; what are the Rights and just Power or
Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that
preserveth and dissolveth it.
Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-wealth.
Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.
Yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.
For my part, when I consider, that in Dreams, I do not often, nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, Nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion that rude people have Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; […] And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly men.
Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind in Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we many honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense.
Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorporeall body, or (which is all one) an incorporeall substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all.
And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, Insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of Bread in Cheese; or Immateriall Substances; or of A free Subject; A free-Will; or any Free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.
But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.
And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second cause, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish from withal. In such a condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; […] no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak of more particularly, in the two following chapters.
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath proceeded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.
The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.
This considered, the Kingdome of Darknesse, as it is set forth in these, and other places of the Scripture, is nothing else but a Confederacy of Deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavor by dark, and erroneous Doctrines, to extinguish in them the Light, both of Nature, and of the Gospell; and so to dis-prepare them for the Kingdome of God to come.
