When Germany sparked the Second World War by invading neighboring countries, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler’s aims were ostensibly just to regain lost territory and secure additional lands. Soon, though, Hitler and his SS head Heinrich Himmler recognized another possibility for these invasions: they could fuel a race war meant to eliminate European Jews. Hitler insisted that the Germans were a “master race” that was superior to every other race, and that Jewish people posed an insidious threat to German supremacy—a belief that led to the Final Solution, a plan to systematically slaughter Europe’s Jews. To get the German people on board with such extreme barbarity, Hitler had to frame all Jewish people—including German Jews—as a foreign enemy seeking to hurt Germany in the war. Ordinary Men lays out the process by which political and military leaders can transform a conventional war into a race war by framing people of a certain race as foreign enemies who threaten national identity.
At the start of the war, as Germany began invading neighboring countries, German military and political leaders framed the war as a chance to destroy allegedly dangerous ideologies like Bolshevism (Russian communism implemented after the Bolshevik Revolution in the 1910s). They claimed that this was “for the benefit of Germany, Europe, yes, the entire world.” The order of this list is telling: Germany is the beneficiary first and foremost, whereas Europe and the rest of the world seem tacked on as afterthoughts. Browning suggests that, in war, there’s a natural “polarization between […] one’s comrades and the enemy”—in other words, an us-versus-them dynamic. In neatly categorizing people as either us or them, comrade or enemy, Germany managed to bolster its people’s sense of unity and national identity while simultaneously villainizing and dehumanizing non-Germans, thereby providing justification for extreme violence against them.
After firmly establishing the idea that Germany had an enemy and needed to destroy it, German military leaders could then begin framing Europe’s Jews as that enemy. Notably, they made it seem important to Germany’s national identity to exterminate all the Jews from Germany and the rest of Europe. This tactic was largely successful: using RPB 101’s mass execution of Jews in the Polish town of Józefów as an example, Browning highlights how the battalion’s willingness to kill Polish Jews just for being Jewish is proof that the men in RPB 101 “at least accepted the assimilation of the Jews into the image of the enemy.” This means that the men in the battalion began to believe that all Jews were enemies of the German people, and so it was somehow acceptable and necessary for the men to systematically execute them. This highlights how frightfully easy it is for political and military leaders to twist a conventional war into a race-based one.
In fact, throughout RPB 101’s mass slaughter of Jews, one particular factor seemed to give them pause: meeting German Jews who had been forcibly resettled in Poland. Browning speculates that to meet Jewish people who were also Germans—just like the soldiers—must have been “unexpected and jarring” because it provided “a sharp contrast to their usual view of the Jews as part of a foreign enemy”; suddenly, the victims seemed quite similar to the soldiers themselves. While this similarity unsettled some of the men, the us-versus-them dynamic proved more powerful. By this point, most of the men had accepted the image of Jewish people as “racially inferior” enemies to the “racially superior Germans,” and so the battalion continued mass executions. That the men in RPB 101 were willing to murder fellow Germans to allegedly promote German supremacy highlights how successful the Nazis were in “subsum[ing] the Jews into the ‘image of the enemy.’” Indeed, Browning asserts that “Nothing helped the Nazis to wage a race war so much as the war itself,” meaning that they successfully leveraged their conventional geopolitical war into a vicious race war targeting Europe’s Jews.
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Nationalism, War, and Ethnic Cleansing Quotes in Ordinary Men
The male Jews of working age were to be separated and taken to a work camp. The remaining Jews—the women, children, and elderly—were to be shot on the spot by the battalion. Having explained what awaited his men, Trapp then made an extraordinary offer: if any of the older men among them did not feel up to the task that lay before him, he could step out.
The men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 were from the lower orders of German society. They had experienced neither social nor geographic mobility. Very few were economically independent. Except for apprenticeship or vocational training, virtually none had any education after leaving Volksschule (terminal secondary school) at age fourteen or fifteen. […] By virtue of their age, of course, all went through their formative period in the pre-Nazi era. These were men who had known political standards and moral norms other than those of the Nazis. Most came from Hamburg, by reputation one of the least nazified cities in Germany, and the majority came from a social class that had been anti-Nazi in its political culture. These men would not seem to have been a very promising group from which to recruit mass murderers on behalf of the Nazi vision of a racial utopia free of Jews.
After explaining the battalion’s murderous assignment, he made his extraordinary offer: any of the older men who did not feel up to the task that lay before them could step out. Trapp paused, and after some moments one man from Third Company, Otto-Julius Schimke, stepped forward. Captain Hoffmann, who had arrived in Józefów directly from Zakrzów with the Third Platoon of Third Company and had not been part of the officers’ meetings in Biłgoraj the day before, was furious that one of his men had been the first to break ranks. Hoffmann began to berate Schimke, but Trapp cut him off. After he had taken Schimke under his protection, some ten or twelve other men stepped forward as well. They turned in their rifles and were told to await a further assignment from the major.
As important as the lack of time for reflection was the pressure for conformity—the basic identification of men in uniform with their comrades and the strong urge not to separate themselves from the group by stepping out. The battalion had only recently been brought up to full strength, and many of the men did not yet know each other well; the bonds of military comradeship were not yet fully developed. Nonetheless, the act of stepping out that morning in Józefów meant leaving one’s comrades and admitting that one was “too weak” or “cowardly.” Who would have “dared,” one policeman declared emphatically, to “lose face” before the assembled troops. “If the question is posed to me why I shot with the others in the first place,” said another who subsequently asked to be excused after several rounds of killing, “I must answer that no one wants to be thought a coward.” It was one thing to refuse at the beginning, he added, and quite another to try to shoot but not be able to continue. Another policeman—more aware of what truly required courage—said quite simply, “I was cowardly.”
What is clear is that the men’s concern for their standing in the eyes of their comrades was not matched by any sense of human ties with their victims. The Jews stood outside their circle of human obligation and responsibility. Such a polarization between “us” and “them,” between one’s comrades and the enemy, is of course standard in war.
It would seem that even if the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 had not consciously adopted the anti-Semitic doctrines of the regime, they had at least accepted the assimilation of the Jews into the image of the enemy. Major Trapp appealed to this generalized notion of the Jews as part of the enemy in his early-morning speech. The men should remember, when shooting Jewish women and children, that the enemy was killing German women and children by bombing Germany.
This figure needs to be put into some wider perspective in order to show the ferocity of the Międzyrzec deportation even by the Nazi standards of 1942. About 300,000 Jews were deported from Warsaw between July 22 and September 21, 1942. The total number of Jews killed by gunfire over this two-month period was recorded as 6,687. In Warsaw, therefore, the ration between those killed on the spot and those deported was approximately 2 percent. The same ration for Międzyrzec was nearly 9 percent. The Jews of Międzyrzec did not march “like sheep to the slaughter.” They were driven with an almost unimaginable ferocity and brutality that left a singular imprint even on the memories of the increasingly numbed and callous participants from Reserve Police Battalion 101.
Major Trapp immediately reported to Lublin that 3 “bandits,” 78 Polish “accomplices,” and 180 Jews had been executed in retaliation for the ambush of Jobst in Talcyn. Apparently the man who had wept through the massacre at Józefów and still shied from the indiscriminate slaughter of Poles no longer had any inhibitions about shooting more than enough Jews to meet his quota.
But the “Jew hunt” was different. Once again they saw their victims face to face, and the killing was personal. More important, each individual policeman once again had a considerable degree of choice. How each exercised that choice revealed the extent to which the battalion had divided into the “tough” and the “weak.” In the months since Józefów many had become numbed, indifferent, and in some cases eager killers; others limited their participation in the killing process, refraining when they could do so without great cost or inconvenience. Only a minority of nonconformists managed to preserve a beleaguered sphere of moral autonomy that emboldened them to employ patterns of behavior and stratagems of evasion that kept them from becoming killers at all.
Though the “Jew hunt” has received little attention, it was an important and statistically significant phase of the Final Solution. A not inconsiderable percentage of Jewish victims in the General Government lost their lives in this way. Statistics aside, the “Jew hunt” is a psychologically important key to the mentality of the perpetrators. Many of the German occupiers in Poland may have witnessed or participated in ghetto roundups on several occasions—in a lifetime, a few brief moments that could be easily repressed. But the “Jew hunt” was not a brief episode. It was a tenacious, remorseless, ongoing campaign in which the “hunters” tracked down and killed their “prey” in direct and personal confrontation. It was not a passing phase but an existential condition of constant readiness and intention to kill every last Jew who could be found.
Thus, wartime brutalization through prior combat was not an immediate experience directly influencing the policemen’s behavior at Józefów. Once the killing began, however, the men became increasingly brutalized. As in combat, the horrors of the initial encounter eventually became routine, and the killing became progressively easier. In this sense, brutalization was not the cause but the effect of these men’s behavior.
War, a struggle between “our people” and “the enemy,” creates a polarized world in which “the enemy” is easily objectified and removed from the community of human obligation.
Orders were orders, and no one in such a political climate could be expected to disobey them, they insisted. Disobedience surely meant the concentration camp if not immediate execution, possibly for their families as well. The perpetrators had found themselves in a situation of impossible “duress” and therefore could not be help responsible for their actions. Such, at least, is what defendants said in trial after trial in postwar Germany.
There is a general problem with this explanation, however. Quite simply, in the past forty-five years no defense attorney or defendant in any of the hundreds of postwar trials has been able to document a single case in which refusal to obey an order to kill unarmed civilians resulted in the allegedly inevitable dire punishment.
At the same time, however, the collective behavior of Reserve Police Battalion 101 has deeply disturbing implications. There are many societies afflicted by traditions of racism and caught in the siege mentality of war or threat of war. Everywhere society conditions people to respect and defer to authority, and indeed could scarcely function otherwise. Everywhere people seek career advancement. In every modern society, the complexity of life and the resulting bureaucratization and specialization attenuate the sense of personal responsibility of those implementing official policy. Within virtually every social collective, the peer group exerts tremendous pressures on behavior and sets moral norms. If the men of Reserve Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot?
