The Consolation of Philosophy: Book II, Part VII Summary & Analysis

Boethius is half-right, half-wrong here. He is clearly calling on Plato’s argument in the Republic: the most virtuous and wise people should be called to govern human societies, but only out of a sense of obligation, because a desire for power indicates that one will likely misuse power. Boethius insists that he was wise and virtuous, but also admits that he was consciously seeking fame and recognition for his good character. Readers should ask if this desire for fame undermines his claim to have been virtuous. After all, Philosophy’s response clearly sets fame alongside wealth and power as meaningless worldly pursuits, which are unrelated to true happiness.

Here, Philosophy’s monologue operates on three different levels at the same time. On a literal level, she is telling Boethius that it is worthless to do things for the sake of fame, because most people who do so are forgotten anyway, and even people who are remembered do not get remembered forever. But they do end up as souls in the afterlife forever, so people should focus on that instead. At the same time, by pointing to the way that important events from history are forgotten throughout time, she also explains both the motivation for Boethius’s lifelong focus—the preservation of the works of Ancient Greek philosophers who were rapidly being forgotten in his time—and the ultimate insignificance of this project, for him, in relation to the far greater and more personal question of what to do in the face of impending death. And finally, when we encounter this monologue as contemporary readers, we should also wonder what has been left out of the historical record about Boethius’s own life, works, and reception: indeed, nobody has ever conclusively proven whether he was innocent or guilty of the crimes with which he was charged, and it is impossible to recover many of the most important details about his life and death.