An evolutionarily stable strategy, or an evolutionarily stable state (both of which are abbreviated to “ESS”), exists when the entities that are competing in an environment stay in stable ratios from generation to generation. In the natural world, an evolutionarily stable strategy arises when organisms behave in such a way that their genes stay in the same proportions from generation to generation. In the molecular world, an evolutionarily stable state arises when molecules form that tend to stay connected (or “stable”) over time. Evolutionarily stable strategies and states are difficult to disrupt. When they are disrupted, the ratio of different kinds of genes swings back and forth like a pendulum until it settles on a new balance that stays that way from generation to generation. This is what happens when “a little bit of evolution” occurs. The concept was invented by John Maynard Smith, and is used by Richard Dawkins to explain genetic evolution.
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Evolutionarily Stable Strategy/State (ESS) Term Timeline in The Selfish Gene
The timeline below shows where the term Evolutionarily Stable Strategy/State (ESS) appears in The Selfish Gene. The colored dots and icons indicate which themes are associated with that appearance.
Chapter 5: Aggression
...of explaining behavior strategies in animals from an evolutionary perspective. Maynard Smith uses the term evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) to describe behavior that best increases the chance of survival, relative to the way...
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...become “stable,” meaning they stay relatively consistent from generation to generation. This is called an evolutionarily stable strategy. One can also think of an evolutionarily stable strategy as a situation in which...
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...perplexing animal behaviors start to make sense when one realizes they are the result of evolutionarily stable strategies. These include behaviors like “gloved fist” aggression, meaning threatening but not always fighting, or the...
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Maynard Smith says there are three factors affecting behaviors that will become evolutionarily stable strategies. The first is differences in size and strength. For example, large animals are more likely...
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...the hierarchy suffer. But Dawkins thinks that dominance hierarchies are just another example of an evolutionarily stable strategy.
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...is wrong. He thinks many behaviors that look altruistic exist because they happen to be evolutionarily stable strategies.
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...example, lions eat antelopes, but they don’t eat other lions. Dawkins thinks it’s not an evolutionarily stable strategy for lions to be cannibals. If a lion eats all the other lions who are...
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Dawkins believes that explaining behavior in terms of evolutionarily stable strategies is going to be one of the “most important advances to evolutionary theory since Darwin.”...
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The evolutionarily stable strategy concept is also useful for explaining why genes appear to “cooperate.” Dawkins revisits the oarsmen...
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...overall finds a new balance, it becomes stable under these new terms, and a new evolutionarily stable state is reached. This means “a little bit of evolution has occurred.”
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Chapter 6: Genesmanship
...them, and remained in the gene pool. Dawkins thinks that mimicking songbird eggs is an evolutionarily stable strategy for cuckoos.
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Chapter 7: Family Planning
Dawkins thinks that, depending on the species, different combinations of caring and bearing will be evolutionarily stable strategies. The only strategy that will not be stable is a “caring only” strategy. If every...
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Chapter 9: Battle of the Sexes
...and become numerous. Ultimately, an equal ratio of males to females ends up being the evolutionarily stable state.
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...costs and benefits of each strategy over a few generations, it turns out that the evolutionarily stable state is reached when most females act “coy,” and just over half the males act “faithful,”...
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Chapter 10: You Scratch My Back, I’ll Ride on Yours
...all cheats (and eventually shrink in numbers or die out), or mostly grudgers. Both are evolutionarily stable strategies.
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Chapter 12: Nice Guys Finish First
Axelrod called “Tit for Tat” a “robust” strategy. Dawkins calls it an evolutionarily stable strategy. Interestingly, “Tit for Tat” doesn’t win in an environment where most other strategies are nasty....
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...defect” is played often, and early in the game, it will dominate and become the evolutionarily stable strategy.
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