In The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau asks where human society comes from and whether it can be founded on “any legitimate and sure principle.” Like his famous predecessors Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Rousseau concludes that people form society by making an agreement—or social contract—in which they sacrifice some of their own freedom in exchange for certain rights. Hobbes believed that people renounce their freedom to society, whereas Locke saw society as a means of preserving God-given natural rights. Rousseau, however, argues that a well-founded and well-run society is actually the source of true human freedom. For Rousseau, the social contract helps people convert their “natural freedom” into a higher “civil freedom” that truly enables them to realize their potential.
Rousseau first aims to show that it is theoretically possible for humans to live under a state without sacrificing their freedom. He believes that freedom and self-preservation are essential to humans’ “very nature,” so nobody can coherently “renounce [their] freedom,” which would also mean “renounc[ing their] humanity.” By extension, nobody can legitimately consent to the authority of any state that takes away their freedom—they can only be forced to live under such a state. If a state is to be legitimate, it must be based on people’s free consent to be governed. But other prominent philosophers’ theories of society make no room for this: for instance, Hobbes thinks that the strong create society to benefit themselves by oppressing the weak, and Aristotle argued that some people are naturally “born for slavery.” Rousseau, however, believes that no truly legitimate society can be based on oppression: a well-functioning society must be a source of freedom, rather than placing limitations on it.
Having explained what a free society requires, Rousseau next shows how people can actually form one: by making a social contract, they organize themselves into a political community to both realize their freedom as a collective through politics and guarantee themselves the rights they need to realize their freedom as individuals. For Rousseau, in the state of nature before society forms, people have the “natural freedom” to do anything of which they are physically capable. But under this way of life, people inevitably struggle to survive: stronger people can take weaker people’s possessions, territory, or even lives. Eventually, people decide to “unit[e] their separate powers” to fight this state of nature by making a social contract: they agree to “defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all.” But because freedom and self-preservation are the fundamental principles of human decision-making, nobody would agree to the social contract unless everyone “remains as free as before” under it. Specifically, through the social contract, people trade their “natural freedom” for “civil freedom,” or a set of common rights that guarantee freedom from unjust harm. Individuals agree to this trade because everyone else does, too, and so it is in everyone’s self-interest to respect everyone else’s rights and treat all people equally. Accordingly, whereas under “natural freedom” a select few people (the strong and intelligent) are free to trample on everyone else, “civil freedom” extends “moral and lawful equality” to everyone. Not only does the social contract make more people secure and increase the community’s freedom as a whole, but it also institutes a better form of freedom: “civil freedom” is better than “natural freedom” because it is based on rational cooperation, which is the source of morality. With “natural freedom,” people have no guarantee of their own safety, so they must dedicate their energy to their own security. But with “civil freedom,” people can focus on more complex and ambitious expressions of their humanity, such as building houses, forming relationships, or writing books.
Rousseau goes even further by suggesting that a well-founded state cannot possibly trample on its citizens’ freedom, although it can “force [them] to be free.” Most people would say that even an ideal state can take away people’s rights—for instance, by putting them in jail if they commit a crime. But Rousseau actually thinks such punishment furthers people’s freedom. When people agree to receive civil freedom through the social contract, they agree to follow the law—in other words, they agree to accept punishment if they violate others’ freedom. Therefore, a criminal does not lose their freedom by going to jail: rather, they are fulfilling the agreement that gave them freedom in the first place, and therefore they are affirming their own freedom as a member of society. Similarly, a legitimate state can send its citizens to war without violating their freedom: the state protects their freedom, so it is asking people “to risk [their] own [lives] in order to preserve [them].” Similarly, in an ideal state, when a majority outvotes a minority, the majority’s decision would just reflect the general will, or the common interest of all citizens, and the minority would simply be wrong about what is best for them. However, this does not mean that majorities and states never trample on people’s freedom in the real world: Rousseau emphasizes that he is talking about an ideal state.
Indeed, while Rousseau sees society as the best path to true freedom, he was under no illusion that a free society existed or would be easy to create. He saw people being enslaved by society all around him, which explains his famous first line: “Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.” The Social Contract is Rousseau’s attempt to correct existing societies by showing them how they should organize themselves, rather than simply describing how actual societies work, as he did in the Discourse on Inequality. The Discourse gave a historical account of society’s formation, but The Social Contract complemented it by showing what needed to be done for humans to live freely and fully express their capacities through a well-organized society. The world listened: this book, perhaps more than any other, inspired the French Revolution that established Europe’s first major republic since Rome.
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Human Freedom and Society Quotes in The Social Contract
My purpose is to consider if, in political society, there can be any legitimate and sure principle of government, taking men as they are and laws as they might be.
Born as I was the citizen of a free state and a member of its sovereign body, the very right to vote imposes on me the duty to instruct myself in public affairs, however little influence my voice may have in them. And whenever I reflect upon governments, I am happy to find that my studies always give me fresh reasons for admiring that of my own country.
Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.
If there are slaves by nature, it is only because there has been slavery against nature. Force made the first slaves; and their cowardice perpetuates their slavery.
Since no man has any natural authority over his fellows, and since force alone bestows no right, all legitimate authority among men must be based on covenants.
To renounce freedom is to renounce one’s humanity, one’s rights as a man and equally one’s duties. There is no possible quid pro quo for one who renounces everything; indeed such renunciation is contrary to man’s very nature; for if you take away all freedom of the will, you strip a man’s actions of all moral significance. Finally, any covenant which stipulated absolute dominion for one party and absolute obedience for the other would be illogical and nugatory. Is it not evident that he who is entitled to demand everything owes nothing? And does not the single fact of there being no reciprocity, no mutual obligation, nullify the act? For what right can my slave have against me? If everything he has belongs to me, his right is my right, and it would be nonsense to speak of my having a right against myself.
“How to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before.” This is the fundamental problem to which the social contract holds the solution.
The act of association consists of a reciprocal commitment between society and the individual, so that each person, in making a contract, as it were, with himself, finds himself doubly committed, first, as a member of the sovereign body in relation to individuals, and secondly as a member of the state in relation to the sovereign. Here there can be no invoking the principle of civil law which says that no man is bound by a contract with himself, for there is a great difference between having an obligation to oneself and having an obligation to something of which one is a member.
Hence, in order that the social pact shall not be an empty formula, it is tacitly implied in that commitment—which alone can give force to all others—that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body, which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free; for this is the necessary condition which, by giving each citizen to the nation, secures him against all personal dependence, it is the condition which shapes both the design and the working of the political machine, and which alone bestows justice on civil contracts—without it, such contracts would be absurd, tyrannical and liable to the grossest abuse.
Suppose we draw up a balance sheet, so that the losses and gains may be readily compared. What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and the absolute right to anything that tempts him and that he can take; what he gains by the social contract is civil liberty and the legal right of property in what he possesses. If we are to avoid mistakes in weighing the one side against the other, we must clearly distinguish between natural liberty, which has no limit but the physical power of the individual concerned, and civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and we must distinguish also between possession, which is based only on force or “the right of the first occupant,” and property, which must rest on a legal title.
We might also add that man acquires with civil society, moral freedom, which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom. However, I have already said more than enough on this subject, and the philosophical meaning of the word “freedom” is no part of my subject here.
It is in order to avoid becoming the victim of a murderer that one consents to die if one becomes a murderer oneself.
We can no longer ask who is to make laws, because laws are acts of the general will; no longer ask if the prince is above the law, because he is a part of the state; no longer ask if the law can be unjust, because no one is unjust to himself; and no longer ask how we can be both free and subject to laws, for the laws are but registers of what we ourselves desire.
