- All's Well That Ends Well
- Antony and Cleopatra
- As You Like It
- The Comedy of Errors
- Coriolanus
- Cymbeline
- Hamlet
- Henry IV, Part 1
- Henry IV, Part 2
- Henry V
- Henry VI, Part 1
- Henry VI, Part 2
- Henry VI, Part 3
- Henry VIII
- Julius Caesar
- King John
- King Lear
- Love's Labor's Lost
- A Lover's Complaint
- Macbeth
- Measure for Measure
- The Merchant of Venice
- The Merry Wives of Windsor
- A Midsummer Night's Dream
- Much Ado About Nothing
- Othello
- Pericles
- The Rape of Lucrece
- Richard II
- Richard III
- Romeo and Juliet
- Shakespeare's Sonnets
- The Taming of the Shrew
- The Tempest
- Timon of Athens
- Titus Andronicus
- Troilus and Cressida
- Twelfth Night
- The Two Gentlemen of Verona
- Venus and Adonis
- The Winter's Tale
The central threat to Mill’s first principle—that happiness, and nothing but happiness, is inherently good or desirable for human beings—is the objection that there are other inherently good things, and therefore Mill is wrong about the “nothing but” part of his claim. He addresses all these objections together in his fourth chapter, where he argues that his critics are right to say that more things—most notably, virtue—are good in and of themselves. While this might initially seem to completely undermine Mill’s argument, he instead challenges the second link in his critics’ chain of reasoning: he accepts that the…