Euthyphro
by Plato
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Themes and Colors
The Nature of Piety Theme Icon
Wisdom, Action, and Justification Theme Icon
The Socratic Method Theme Icon
LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in Euthyphro, which you can use to track the themes throughout the work.
The Socratic Method Theme Icon
The Socratic Method Theme Icon

In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates attempts to elicit a definition for piety out of Euthyphro, whom he bumps into on the steps of the courthouse. This is not merely an exercise in intellect, for both men will be addressing charges of impiety in their respective cases. In characteristic form, the dialogue proceeds with Socrates posing as the student, who seeks to be educated by Euthyphro, a presumed expert on such matters. Of course, what really transpires through their exchange is that Euthyphro is schooled by Socrates. Socrates is teaching by asking questions that subtly lead Euthyphro through a path of reasoning that will eventually educate Euthyphro about the nature of piety, and not the other way around. The dialogue thus illustrates the “Socratic method" for the reader. Since Euthyphro abruptly ends the conversation and Socrates is left without a satisfactory answer, Plato is implicitly encouraging the reader to can pick up where Euthyphro leaves off and pursue the question in similar fashion. Plato's implication is that learning comes from a place of curiosity and questioning (or, philosophical wonder). Similarly, teaching is not about telling students the answers, but directing curiosity toward reasoned inquiry.

Every time Socrates asks Euthyphro a question, he is in fact teaching Euthyphro what was problematic about Euthyphro’s previous answer, and guiding Euthyphro’s reasoning toward his own idea of what piety must be. When Euthyphro offers a definition of piety, Socrates asks questions that expose contradictions in Euthyphro’s claims. For example, Euthyphro suggests that piety is what the gods love, But Socrates argues that the gods often disagree, so what is loved by one god might be hated by another. Socrates pushes Euthyphro for more answers that avoid such contradictions. For example, after admitting that the gods might disagree, Euthyphro modifies his claim to suggest that piety is only what all the gods love. Socrates leads Euthyphro through a path of reasoning that is constructed by Euthyphro's attempts to self-correct the errors in his previous answers. By answering Socrates’s questions, Euthyphro has argued himself away from his own intuitions about piety: that it has something to do with reverence towards the gods wishes, which can change, might not be consistent across cases, and might not even be knowable. Because of Socrates’s clever teaching method, Euthyphro inadvertently argues himself towards acknowledging that piety must be universal, unchanging, and knowable, which is what Socrates intentionally leads him to think.

The dialogue ultimately ends without an answer about the nature of piety that satisfies Socrates. But this conclusion does not imply that Socrates has failed. Rather, it illustrates what kind of teaching and learning Plato thinks will lead to the answer. Plato is not implying that the question “what is piety?” can’t be answered. In fact, Socrates’s reasoning has moved the conversation closer to an answer, without completing the inquiry. Socrates’s questions are intended to furnish the reader with two things. First, curiosity about the nature of piety. Second, a method for testing potential ideas the reader might come up with. By engaging the reader in Socrates’s unfinished debate with Euthyphro, Plato aims to leave the reader in a state of philosophical wonder about the nature of piety. Plato, as teacher, remains true to this method in the content of the dialogue. He does not offer the reader—or learner—an answer to the question "what is piety?” but a method for reasoned inquiry that will perhaps attain an answer. Plato thus illustrates that teaching isn't about telling students the answers, but prompting them to wonder, and guiding their wonder to fruition through Socratic inquiry.

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The Socratic Method Quotes in Euthyphro

Below you will find the important quotes in Euthyphro related to the theme of The Socratic Method.

Euthyphro Quotes

EUTHYPHRO: […] The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he was a servant of ours. He killed one of our household slaves in drunken anger, so my father bound him hand and foot and threw him in a ditch, then sent a man here to inquire from the priest what should be done. During that time he gave no thought or care to the bound man, as being a killer, and it was no matter if he died, which he did. Hunger and cold and his bonds caused his death before the messenger came back from the seer. Both my father and my other relatives are angry that I am prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of a murderer when he hadn’t even killed him, they say, and even if he had, the dead man does not deserve a thought, since he was a killer. For, they say, it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder. But their ideas of the divine attitude to piety and impiety are wrong, Socrates.

Related Characters: Euthyphro (speaker), Socrates
Page Number and Citation: 5
Explanation and Analysis:
Early in the dialogue, Euthyphro explains why he is charging his own father with murder, and the reader learns that Euthyphro’s indictment is (like Meletus’s indictment) also related to the concept of piety. The quote functions in three important ways. First, the situation that Euthyphro vividly describes is designed to peak the reader’s curiosity and draw them into wondering about who is right and wrong in this case. For Plato, curiosity is an essential part of philosophical reasoning. This passage thus primes the reader to enter the correct frame of mind for the inquiry that follows. Second, Plato introduces a Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor

SOCRATES: […] So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards murder and other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance insofar as it is impious?

EUTHYPHRO: Most certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do you say?

Related Characters: Socrates (speaker), Euthyphro (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 6
Explanation and Analysis:
Socrates and Euthyphro have finished explaining why each of them has business at the courthouse, and Euthyphro has just agreed to share his views about piety with Socrates. Socrates now raises the central question that the dialogue will focus on. In this passage, Plato establishes in clear and explicit terms the dialogue’s main topic of inquiry: the nature of piety. Socrates’s framing of the question is important as it is clear he is after a universal definition of piety, meaning one “form” (or claim about what piety is) that will apply across all situations in which piety might come up. Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Pos

EUTHYPHRO: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious. And observe, Socrates, that I can cite powerful evidence that the law is so. I have already said to others that such actions are right, not to favor the ungodly, whoever they are. These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father for similar reasons.

Related Characters: Euthyphro (speaker), Socrates
Page Number and Citation: 5
Explanation and Analysis:
Right after Socrates has posed the question about piety that frames the dialogue as an inquiry into the nature of piety, Euthyphro swiftly offers his first definition. Euthyphro suggests that piety is prosecuting wrongdoers (which is exactly what he is doing by raising charges against his father), and impiety is failing to do so. To defend his first definition, Euthyphro draws on similarities between his indictment of his father and two stories about gods who also punished their fathers for acting unjustly. Euthyphro’s explanation is indicative of his strategy throughout the dialogue. He consistently leans on the presumed actions, wishes, Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque

SOCRATES: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don’t you remember?

EUTHYPHRO: I do.

SOCRATES: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.

EUTHYPHRO: If that is how you want it, Socrates, that is how I will tell you.

SOCRATES: That is what I want.

EUTHYPHRO: Well then, what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious.

Related Characters: Euthyphro (speaker), Socrates
Page Number and Citation: 6-7
Explanation and Analysis:
Just after Euthyphro has offered his first definition of piety (namely, prosecuting wrongdoers), Socrates swiftly rejects the idea, on grounds that that Euthyphro has merely described one example of piety, but it’s clear that there are many other types of behaviors that might also be count as pious. This passage is important because it indicates that Socrates thinks the nature of piety is universal. This means he is after one definition that will that will help someone clearly distinguish all cases of pious behavior from all cases of impious behavior. This is an early example of the Socratic method at Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a

SOCRATES: But you say that the same things are considered just by
some gods and unjust by others, and as they dispute about these things they are at odds and at war with each other. Is that not so?

EUTHYPHRO: It is.

SOCRATES: The same things then are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and would be both god-loved and god-hated.

EUTHYPHRO: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: And the same things would be both pious and impious, according to this argument?

EUTHYPHRO: I’m afraid so.

SOCRATES: So you did not answer my question, you surprising man.
I did not ask you what same thing is both pious and impious, and it appears that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them.

Related Characters: Euthyphro (speaker), Socrates (speaker)
Page Number and Citation: 7-8
Explanation and Analysis:
As soon as Euthyphro offers his second definition of piety (namely, what is loved by the gods), Socrates takes it as his starting point for analytical scrutiny. Here, the Socratic method really starts to unfold. Socrates takes Euthyphro’s idea and runs through the logical implications of the claim that is offered, in order to show that it results in a self-contradiction. Here, Socrates shows Euthyphro that the gods often disagree, and if that’s the case, then the same thing can be both pious (based on what one god thinks) and impious (based on what another god thinks) at the same Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a deserunt. Sint aperiam consequatur. Minima porro perferendis. Sit neque odit. Tenetur qui dignissimos. Qui et ut. Voluptate labore corporis. Hic tempore laborum. Nisi quia ea. Quia soluta itaque. Deleniti nisi earum. Ad tenetur laboriosam. Eum accusamus harum. Accusantium iusto voluptas. Totam quae corporis. Impedit non ut. Incidunt rerum est. Aperiam doloremque eum. Animi soluta perspiciatis. Ut minima aut

SOCRATES: […] Consider this: Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?

Related Characters: Socrates (speaker), Euthyphro
Page Number and Citation: 10
Explanation and Analysis:
Just after Euthyphro poses his third definition of piety (as what all the gods love), Socrates raises the dilemma of whether the defining feature of something is detected in the thing itself, or if the feature is projected onto it by someone contemplating it. Another example of this type of dilemma might be something like: “Is beauty in the eye of the beholder?” Beauty might be something detected in things, but it might be something projected onto things by the person contemplating them (the beholder). Socrates doesn’t mention beauty himself when he goes on to explain what he means, but Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a deserunt. Sint aperiam consequatur. Minima porro perferendis. Sit neque odit. Tenetur qui dignissimos. Qui et ut. Voluptate labore corporis. Hic tempore laborum. Nisi quia ea. Quia soluta itaque. Deleniti nisi earum. Ad tenetur laboriosam. Eum accusamus harum. Accusantium iusto voluptas. Totam

SOCRATES: It looks as if I was cleverer than Daedalus in using my skill, my friend, insofar as he could only cause to move the things he made himself, but I can make other people’s things move as well as my own.

Related Characters: Socrates (speaker), Euthyphro
Related Symbols: Daedalus
Page Number and Citation: 11
Explanation and Analysis:
This quote arises after Socrates has posed and answered the central dilemma of the dialogue, which asks whether the nature of something resides in the object or the perceiver of the object. Socrates invokes the metaphor of Daedalus (a sculptor famed for making his statues move) to indicate that Euthyphro’s definitions thus far have been circular. Here, he makes a witty joke out of the metaphor, in suggesting he is in fact cleverer than Daedalus, because he can make other people’s things (meaning ideas) move, as well as his own. Socrates’s logic is metaphorically spinning circles around a confused Euthyphro. Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliqua

EUTHYPHRO: I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.

Related Characters: Euthyphro (speaker), Socrates
Page Number and Citation: 12
Explanation and Analysis:
Shortly after Socrates and Euthyphro have discussed the metaphor of Daedalus, Euthyphro offers this fourth definition of piety as care of the gods. This definition marks a turning point in the text in two ways. Up to this point, Euthyphro has been making suggestions about piety that he refines on Socrates’s nudging. Here, however, Socrates takes the lead in suggesting a possible path for reasoning toward the definition of piety. Socrates suggests piety might have something to do with justice, and prompts Euthyphro to suggest which part. The reader is thus exposed to another facet of the Socratic method. In Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a deserunt. Sint aperia

EUTHYPHRO: I told you a short while ago, Socrates, that it is a considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things, but, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve both private houses and public affairs of state. The opposite of these pleasing actions are impious and overturn and destroy everything.

Related Characters: Euthyphro (speaker), Socrates
Page Number and Citation: 14
Explanation and Analysis:
In this passage, Euthyphro offers his fifth and final definition of piety as prayer and sacrifice, which—on Socrates’s probing—he quickly narrows to reframe as sacrifices, or gifts, for the gods, meaning whatever gifts are desired by the gods. The shift in Euthyphro’s tone is palpable here. He has realized he is out of his depth, and is irksome in his response, marking his embarrassment at being fooled by Socrates’s “ignorance.” The dialogue’s discussion about this fifth definition reveals another important thing about what Socrates believes about the nature of piety. Socrates thinks the definition of piety must be knowable. Thus, Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectet

SOCRATES: If you had no clear knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on behalf of a servant. For fear of the gods you would have been afraid to take the risk lest you should not be acting rightly, and would have been ashamed before men, but now I know well that you believe you have clear knowledge of piety and impiety. So tell me, my good Euthyphro, and do not hide what you think it is.

EUTHYPHRO: Some other time, Socrates, for I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to go.

SOCRATES: What a thing to do, my friend!

Related Characters: Socrates (speaker), Euthyphro (speaker), Meletus
Page Number and Citation: 15
Explanation and Analysis:
In the final section of the dialogue, after Socrates has shot down all of Euthyphro’s suggested definitions of piety and comically suggested they start all over again, Euthyphro abruptly ends the conversation. This passage functions in two important ways. First, it shifts the burden of inquiry after the nature of piety away from Euthyphro and towards the reader. Since the dialogue concludes without a satisfactory answer for the nature of piety, the reader is prompted to keep on thinking, using the same method of inquiry that has been illustrated in Socrates’s treatment of Euthyphro’s five failed definitions. Second, Plato’s use Dolorem et quae. Exercitationem non aut. Eveniet dolor non. Incidunt dolores sunt. Ad dolor at. Quia aperiam eligendi. Ut veniam voluptatem. Aperiam consequuntur mollitia. Provident expedita delectus. Occaecati ea suscipit. Optio ut iste. Voluptas aut occaecati. Accusantium recusandae voluptates. Explicabo minus tempore. Nostrum dolor asperiores. Ut aliquam officiis. Unde enim nesciunt. Commodi necessitatibus voluptas. Accusamus eaque omnis. Velit eaque error. Possimus corrupti soluta. Qui aut a. Rerum voluptas debitis. Voluptatem accusantium est. Mollitia eaque ipsa. Perferendis consectetur et. Dicta impedit ut. Ducimus possimus quo. Non inventore in. Eligendi atque placeat. Molestiae earum eum. Libero sit beatae. At a deserunt. Sint aperiam consequatur. Minima porro perferendis. Sit neque odit. Tenetur qui dignissimos. Qui et ut. Voluptate labore corporis. Hic tempore laborum. Nisi quia ea. Quia soluta itaque. Deleniti nisi earum. Ad tenetur laboriosam. Eum accusamus harum. Accusantium iusto voluptas. Totam quae corporis. Impedit non ut. Incidunt rerum est. Aperiam doloremque eum. Animi soluta perspiciatis. Ut minima autem. Modi omnis iure. Sint qui qui. Qui similique praesentium. Ex consequatur magnam. Aliquid iste enim. Sequi aut maxime. Adipisci voluptate et. Voluptas suscipit alias. In et eveniet. Eaque et repellendus. Dolores aut voluptatibus. Voluptatem qui voluptatum. Voluptatibus sed placeat. Aut tenetur autem. Fugit voluptates in. Quidem