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Intro
In the first volume of The German Ideology, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels identify a basic methodological error that has frustrated their contemporaries attempts to develop a truly revolutionary philosophy: idealism. Idealism is particularly widespread in Germany and among Marx and Engels’s former comrades the Young Hegelians, and so they set out to identify how their fellow German philosophers have misinterpreted the world and how to correct their mistakes.
Contrary to the idealist notion that religion and philosophy determine history, Marx and Engels argue for a theory of materialism, which claims that historical events are ultimately determined by the mode of production, which is itself determined by the particular division of labor in a given society. Idealism, which in German philosophy has become an ideology of its own, is a byproduct not of German intellectualism but German weakness—it is a projection of the German petty bourgeoisie’s contradictory ambitions and abilities.
Marx and Engels dismiss Ludwig Feuerbach’s attempt to explain oppression as the limiting of the “essence of man,” instead arguing that the capitalist mode of production is driving society toward an inevitable conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This conflict does, however, create the possibility of abolishing capitalism and the division of labor altogether. To understand and participate in this revolutionary struggle, philosophers must shed their idealistic biases and pretensions.
Marx and Engels critique Bruno Bauer even more harshly than Feuerbach, conceding that Feuerbach’s failed attempts to develop a new, non-ideological philosophy were at least good-faith efforts. Bauer, on the other hand, is an empty, pretentious showman who has clearly not even read some of the books he critiques.
Marx and Engels next undertake an exhaustive analysis of Max Stirner’s The Unique and Its Property, a book they consider so misguided that it merits a detailed critique. Stirner, too, intellectualizes his own ideological perspective as a member of the German petty bourgeoisie (despite his philosophy being so abstract that he loses sight of material concerns entirely). Stirner’s philosophy is built around a repetitive three-part structure, which he first introduces as the child, the youth, and the adult. In this system, intellectual development precedes from faith in things to faith in ideas, and finally to a nuanced faith in oneself—that is, egoism. Stirner, however, believes that the personal experience of discovering or rejecting an idea is equivalent to abolishing that idea’s power in real life, as he applies his schema to ancient Rome, modern liberalism, and other disparate real-world examples. This, Marx and Engels argue, reveals Stirner’s ignorance of actual history, politics, and economics in the process.
Marx and Engels point out that Stirner’s history is often little more than sloppy plagiarism of Hegel. Whereas Hegel believed that ideas could rule the world, however, Stirner seems to think their power can be toppled with other ideas. Stirner categorizes all religious taboos that restrict human freedom as “the holy,” a malign influence he seeks to abolish wherever possible. As Marx and Engels note, however, the idea that people can free themselves of oppression by rejecting certain concepts is pure idealism.
Marx and Engels intersperse their close reading of Stirner with cruel, stinging jokes, frequently comparing Stirner and his follower Szeliga to Sancho Panza and Don Quixote. Stirner’s rejection of communism is particularly offensive to Marx and Engels, as it is grounded in a completely ignorant understanding not just of communism, but also modern private property in general. Marx and Engels point out particular rhetorical devices Stirner uses to paper over the cracks in his theories, such as his reliance on synonyms and false etymology to connect unrelated concepts. Ultimately, they argue, the “humane liberalism” Stirner suggests as an alternative to both actually existing liberalism and communism is nothing more than German petty bourgeois ideology, a self-justification for Stirner’s worldview.
Marx and Engels then critique Stirner’s discussion of rights and society. Stirner rejects the liberal notion of “freedom” in favor of peculiarity, a concept which Marx and Engels point out is just as vague and idealistic. They argue that Stirner’s explanation of egoism reveals his misunderstanding of communism.
Stirner’s theories ultimately say very little about society as it actually exists, argue Marx and Engels, as he remains entirely within the realm of ideology throughout his book. Stirner characteristically gets his theory of the state completely backwards, blaming capitalism’s ills entirely on the state. For Stirner, the problem with private property is that it is not free enough. This ignores the material causes of the development of the modern state—that is, the rise of the bourgeoisie, and with them modern capitalism. Marx and Engels suggest that Stirner’s misplaced faith in the total power of the state is another manifestation of his petty bourgeois worldview, as Germans of his social class feel restricted and surveilled by the backward and autocratic Prussian regime.
In actuality, it is the bourgeoisie who rule the state, which depends on them more and more for money and resources. Marx and Engels argue that Stirner misunderstands this, too, because of his lack of perspective: the undeveloped, bureaucratic nature of German capitalism does not reflect how the system truly operates. Stirner’s answer to the oppression of the state, “the holy,” and all manner of other unpleasant concepts is rebellion, a vague declaration of personal independence which Marx and Engels dismiss completely.
Stirner also suggests an alternative social model called the union, characterized by a hybrid regime of private and collective property. As Marx and Engels note, Stirner’s union is simply an idealistic reimaging of capitalism as it already exists. Marx and Engels are similarly skeptical of Stirner’s philosophy of self-enjoyment, which they argue is always little more than an expression of ruling-class habits and norms.
Marx and Engels also attack Stirner for his faith in “species,” a nonsensical kind of biological determinism which, like the “essence of man,” applies a fixed, idealistic category to socially produced aspects of human nature. What Stirner ultimately wants is a world where human contact is unmediated by the mode of production, an impossible desire—unless that mode can be abolished through communist revolution. Reflecting on Stirner’s commentary to his book, Marx and Engels emphasize the importance for philosophers of basing their work on material reality and not confusing ideas for the real world.
In the second volume, Marx and Engels critique a number of other leading German socialist thinkers who they view as similarly blinded by ideological and idealist biases, dubbing them “true socialists.” These philosophers are disconnected from actual politics (unlike their peers in France and England) and busy themselves with philosophical debate about “truth” and “essence,” taking smug satisfaction in their ideological purity—and political irrelevance. The “true socialists” are also a symptom of post-Hegelian German philosophy’s petty bourgeois character, suggest Marx and Engels, and will become irrelevant once the communist movement establishes itself in Germany.
Marx and Engels first critique a number of writers for Die Rheinischen Jahrbücher, pointing out their historical ignorance and lack of writerly sophistication. They then turn to Karl Grün, painstakingly revealing Grün’s tendency to plagiarize and overlook major factual errors in his own writing. Ultimately the “true socialists” fail to understand Hegelian philosophy enough to supersede it, argue Marx and Engels, leading them back into idealism and elaborate justifications for the ruling ideology.
Marx and Engels conclude the book with a brief critique of a lecture given by the otherwise unimportant Georg Kuhlmann, which they present as a prime example of the self-justifying philosophy of the bourgeoise and their attempts to dispel criticism of their social system and worldview.
