Beyond Good and Evil: 2. The Free Spirit Summary & Analysis

Nietzsche expresses wonder at the degree of falsehood in which humans live. He argues that our knowledge is based on a much deeper and stronger foundation of ignorance, a simplification of the world around us. Going even further, he suggests that the will to knowledge is not at all the opposite of the will to ignorance but is its “refinement.” Once again, Nietzsche forcefully claims that what are posited as opposites are merely differences of degree, a thought that language itself makes it difficult for humans to grasp. Considering science—and philosophy—as a falsification of the world, Nietzsche then expounds on the irony of sacrificing oneself to the truth, which he sees as a pointless endeavor.

Discussing the individual and the crowd, Nietzsche suggests a paradoxical formula: while those who feel at home in the crowd are not destined for knowledge, those who retreat from the world are equally cut off from it. The philosopher, rather, must understand the “average man.” There is, however, a shortcut in the form of cynicism, which Nietzsche considers to be an unphilosophical grasping of the truth about the average man, which the philosopher would do well to learn from. Borrowing terms from Sanskrit, Nietzsche continues to develop the theme of the free spirit who does not fit into the crowd. He also expresses frustration at the impossibility of translating certain qualities from one language to another, finding German particularly lacking.

Independence, Nietzsche argues, is a privilege due only to the strongest, and is moreover a very risky endeavor that forever sets one apart from the crowd. Likewise, the greatest insights strike those who are not ready to hear them as errors or even crimes. Nietzsche privileges the esoteric approach to philosophy over the exoteric, arguing that the philosopher should look down from above on the problems of the world. Nietzsche then cautions the young, whose strict binary thinking and lack of nuance limit their access to truth. However, he also asserts, paradoxically, that love of nuance and excessive criticism of the moral strictness of youth is just as much an expression of youth, not maturity.

Nietzsche begins to lay out his theory of morality, claiming that throughout most of history, actions have been judged for their consequences. Under contemporary morality, however, they are judged by their origin, the intention behind them. Nietzsche finds this deeply misguided and asks how one can understand an action through intention, as conscious intentions are merely the expression of deeper, unconscious drives such as the will to power. Contrasting what he calls the “pre-moral” period of history with the moral era, Nietzsche wonders if an “extra-moral” time is close at hand. Morality, as philosophers have understood it, is to Nietzsche yet another prejudice, making the self-overcoming of morality an urgent task for the philosophers of the future.

Nietzsche expresses his skepticism of the morality of self-denial. Equally suspicious is the faith in the righteousness of the modern world. Nietzsche contrasts the negative connotations of a suspicious character in modern, bourgeois society with the falseness of that same society’s own morals, and claims that philosophers have both the right and the duty to be suspicious. A true philosopher questions everything. At the same time, Nietzsche is scornful of the search for truth as its own moral idea, mocking Voltaire. He wonders if we can understand any part of reality but our own drives, and reasserts his proposition that the world is determined by the will to power.

Taking the French Revolution as an example, Nietzsche argues that commentators often interpret a text or event until the original is no longer visible, thereby losing access to the past. He then suggests that while happiness and virtue are unconnected to truth, perhaps unhappiness and evil do have a relationship to it. Nietzsche suggests that the unhappy and the evil may have a privileged access to the truth, as their lack of morals engenders a strong and independent spirit. Nietzsche also argues that the profound is closely connected to masks and disguise. As the profound is precious, one must guard it with disguises; at the same time the profound attracts misinterpretation, which also add to its disguises.

In advocating the life of a free spirit, Nietzsche urges  both caution and bravery, arguing that the free spirit must constantly test themselves. Moreover, they must be careful never to get stuck to other people, places, or social positions, or to particular sciences, philosophies, thoughts, or feelings. The true test of independence, rather, is conserving oneself. Nietzsche sees a new kind of philosopher emerging which embodies this ideal, who he refers to as “attempters.” These new philosophers, while advocates of truth, are fundamentally opposed to the dogmatists Nietzsche criticizes, and therefore are opposed to popular morality as well. As free spirits, they will demand their truths for themselves, not the common good; to Nietzsche, the common good is above all common, and profundity is beyond its reach.

While Nietzsche believes that the philosophers of the future are certainly free spirits, he also argues that they will transcend that category. Clarifying his thoughts, he harshly criticizes the shallow understanding of free spirits found throughout modern Europe. For Nietzsche the incorrectly designated free spirits, whom he calls “levelers,” are the ideologues of modernity and democracy, finding in traditional forms of the society the root of human suffering. This, to Nietzsche, is an expression of herd mentality and a refusal of greatness. He strongly rejects the desire to abolish suffering, which he sees as the necessary constraint through which humans grow and develop.

By contrast to the false free spirits of modernity, Nietzsche’s philosophers of the future see suffering, hardness, force, and other “immoral” affects as just as essential to humankind’s development as pleasure, safety, and happiness. These philosophers will live and work in solitude, unlike the free spirits of the crowd, who seek comfort and security above all else. The philosophy of the future, rejecting and transcending the morality developed by dogmatic philosophy, will be one that moves “beyond good and evil.”