Beyond Good and Evil

Contrasting moral sentiment with “the science of morals,” Nietzsche finds the former to be far more complex and developed. Indeed, he finds the term “science” to be excessive for such an undeveloped field of thought. Nietzsche then proposes a typology of morals to lay the foundations for such a science. Of course, past philosophers have not been so humble, and instead aimed to rationally explain morality. To Nietzsche this is not a rational philosophy, but merely an expression of the individual philosopher’s faith in the morality they hope to justify, much like their philosophy in general expresses their inner drives and prejudices. 

Nietzsche proposes to divide moralities into types according to their function: some moralities justify one to others, some generate self-satisfaction, some disguise, and so on. What these various moralities all share is their general function as an expression—“a sign language”—of affects. All of these moralities, too, go against both nature and reason, compelling them to bend to their will. This, however, Nietzsche does not see as a problem, comparing it to the compulsion that languages experience at the hands of rhyme and rhythm. Rather, it is precisely the introduction of constraints that develops humankind’s “strength and freedom.” While morality narrows the perspective of its adherents, Nietzsche finds this discipline a necessary condition of life and growth.

Using the example of how for the English the Sabbath functions as a kind of fast from working, increasing the desire to return to work the next day, Nietzsche argues that drives sharpen and develop themselves by denying themselves satisfaction. This explains the development of the modern understanding of sexual love despite the influence of Christian morality, too. Looking at Plato, Nietzsche finds that certain out-of-place instances of moral utilitarianism in his philosophy have their origin in “the rabble,” the crowd, an insight that he believes is applicable to philosophy in general.

Nietzsche suggests that the theological opposition of faith and knowledge is in fact the same opposition as instinct and reason, and that this debate can be traced back to Socrates. While Nietzsche believes that Socrates’s attempt to resolve the problem was incorrect, he finds in Plato’s opposite answer the origin of most of philosophy’s mishaps since. Plato, by trying to prove that both instinct and reason have the same goal of “the good,” paved the way for the instinct of Christian morality to triumph over the reason of philosophy. Rather than trusting our instinct and reason to be on the same path, Nietzsche offers a counterexample, showing how our senses deceive us by drawing on our memory. Lying, to ourselves or others, is habitual and ingrained.

Nietzsche argues for taking seriously what occurs in one’s dreams, as these experiences meaningfully alter a person’s consciousness after they wake up. He then offers some examples of distinct human psychologies and the ways that different ideas of possession satisfy or fail to satisfy different individuals. Love, to Nietzsche, always involves a degree of possession, as does parenting. Nietzsche then looks at the history of the Jews and finds a historically significant “inversion of values” through which the poor became righteous, and the rich became evil. This, to Nietzsche, was the beginning of “the slave rebellion in morals.” Drawing on astronomy, Nietzsche then reminds the reader how much psychology depends on inference to understand processes we cannot directly observe.

Proposing a hypothetical chapter on “Morality as Timidity,” Nietzsche wonders why moralists are so distressed by the tropics and their healthy abundance. This privileging of temperance is similar to moralities of happiness, in which Nietzsche finds merely prudence and elaborate controls for one’s passions. He then argues that the need to obey is innate to humankind, and that this explains much of the tumultuous, unpredictable nature of human development.

The problem in modern Europe stems from refusal of those who command to truly take up their roles. Equally influenced by the “herd instinct,” they deceive themselves and pretend to be one with the herd. The herd man, conversely, is held up as a moral good in his own right. The falseness of this doctrine of equality is proven by the case of Napoleon; when someone ready to command appears, the herd is not only willing but happy to obey.

Nietzsche believes that modernity is an “age of disintegration” in which races are mixed “indiscriminately,” leading to contradictory feelings and desires within individuals. These impure individuals are not only weaker but seek rest above all else, a relief from their own incongruous nature. On the other hand, some individuals of this type are made even stronger by the need to constantly master the irreconcilable aspect of their being; among them Nietzsche counts Caesar and Leonardo da Vinci.

As morality is conditioned by the community in which it exists—the herd—immorality includes all that is perceived as dangerous to the community. This, Nietzsche argues, makes a morality of “neighbor love” impossible. Rather, “neighbor love” is an imagined alternative to a real fear of the neighbor. Certain behaviors, when no longer useful to society, are branded as immoral and suppressed, and their opposites are valued instead. Fear is the source of morality, leading to the ostracization of all who are different in a community. Even worse, to Nietzsche, is the way this morality ultimately seeks to abolish itself, refusing to punish—and inspire fear in—those who threaten it.

Nietzsche, while aware of the insulting nature of his comparing morality to the herd instinct, insists that it is the most appropriate description. European morality now believes that it knows good and evil, and while it is but one kind of morality, as a herd morality it denies the possibility of such other moralities. Enabled by Christianity, the “democratic movement” has become the supreme expression of the herd instinct. This mentality, to Nietzsche, includes both democrats and revolutionaries alike, despite their differences. Sharing a faith in pity, the adherents of this herd mentality ultimately believe only in themselves. 

Nietzsche and the philosophers of the future, in contrast, believe not in the herd but in strong individuals, in the future of humankind as the future of the will. To achieve such a future will require both creating and exploiting its conditions, forcing the soul to find eternal values once again, an endeavor which is fraught with the risk that the leaders it hopes to create will fail to appear. Nietzsche sees both the great potential that still remains in humankind and the dangerous degeneration it is undergoing, an understanding that leaves him with both a great burden and a mission.