Themes
Key
LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in Beyond Good and Evil, which you can use to track the themes throughout the work.
Good and Evil
Knowledge, Truth, and Untruth
The Individual and the Crowd
The Dark Side of Modernity
Women and Men
Summary
Analysis
Contrasting moral sentiment with “the science of morals,” Nietzsche finds the former to be far more complex and developed. Indeed, he finds the term “science” to be excessive for such an undeveloped field of thought. Nietzsche then proposes a typology of morals to lay the foundations for such a science. Of course, past philosophers have not been so humble, and instead aimed to rationally explain morality. To Nietzsche this is not a rational philosophy, but merely an expression of the individual philosopher’s faith in the morality they hope to justify, much like their philosophy in general expresses their inner drives and prejudices.
Nietzsche argues that because morality has so powerfully conditioned the thinking of past philosophers, very few of them have actually critically examined morality. Instead, they have accepted the fundamental truth of (Platonic-Christian-democratic) morality and worked backward to prove it. This acceptance of a fundamentally true morality, Nietzsche argues, has led to the confusions and contradictions that plague these philosophers’ bodies of work. Of course, philosophy is always expressing a drive that is already present. To Nietzsche, the goal is to understand these drives and their purpose and then to command them through the will. He argues against using reason to overcome them.
Themes
Nietzsche proposes to divide moralities into types according to their function: some moralities justify one to others, some generate self-satisfaction, some disguise, and so on. What these various moralities all share is their general function as an expression—“a sign language”—of affects. All of these moralities, too, go against both nature and reason, compelling them to bend to their will. This, however, Nietzsche does not see as a problem, comparing it to the compulsion that languages experience at the hands of rhyme and rhythm. Rather, it is precisely the introduction of constraints that develops humankind’s “strength and freedom.” While morality narrows the perspective of its adherents, Nietzsche finds this discipline a necessary condition of life and growth.
Nietzsche continues to draw on his philological background to critically reexamine philosophy, treating thought and emotion—or affect—as a language of its own. Nietzsche also here clearly states his theory of “productive constraint,” arguing that limits and discipline are sometimes more beneficial to growth and development than freedom. Elsewhere he will use this same conceptual argument to advocate for the necessity of hardness, cruelty, and even violence in human life, and to condemn misguided attempts to abolish these ugly aspects of human existence.
Themes
Using the example of how for the English the Sabbath functions as a kind of fast from working, increasing the desire to return to work the next day, Nietzsche argues that drives sharpen and develop themselves by denying themselves satisfaction. This explains the development of the modern understanding of sexual love despite the influence of Christian morality, too. Looking at Plato, Nietzsche finds that certain out-of-place instances of moral utilitarianism in his philosophy have their origin in “the rabble,” the crowd, an insight that he believes is applicable to philosophy in general.
Nietzsche once again indirectly comments on desire in a way that aligns with later psychoanalytic arguments; for him, desire is not necessarily even about satisfying desire: it’s about the drive itself. The Christian virtue of abstinence, therefore, is not the moral achievement it purports to be. Instead, it is simply another expression of unsatisfied desire that in fact feeds the “evil” it seeks to abolish. Turning directly to utilitarian thought for the first time, Nietzsche finds its origin in a “common” mode of thinking that is quite unlike the disinterested, noble thought that characterizes true philosophy.
Themes
Nietzsche suggests that the theological opposition of faith and knowledge is in fact the same opposition as instinct and reason, and that this debate can be traced back to Socrates. While Nietzsche believes that Socrates’s attempt to resolve the problem was incorrect, he finds in Plato’s opposite answer the origin of most of philosophy’s mishaps since. Plato, by trying to prove that both instinct and reason have the same goal of “the good,” paved the way for the instinct of Christian morality to triumph over the reason of philosophy. Rather than trusting our instinct and reason to be on the same path, Nietzsche offers a counterexample, showing how our senses deceive us by drawing on our memory. Lying, to ourselves or others, is habitual and ingrained.
Nietzsche restates in greater detail the allegation he first makes in the preface—that Plato’s invention of “the good” is a kind of philosophical original sin, leading to a collective understanding of morality that corrodes the hierarchical nature of society. What this amounts to is in fact a denial of the full breadth of human nature, which encompasses the will to ignorance as much as it does the will to truth.
Themes
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Nietzsche argues for taking seriously what occurs in one’s dreams, as these experiences meaningfully alter a person’s consciousness after they wake up. He then offers some examples of distinct human psychologies and the ways that different ideas of possession satisfy or fail to satisfy different individuals. Love, to Nietzsche, always involves a degree of possession, as does parenting. Nietzsche then looks at the history of the Jews and finds a historically significant “inversion of values” through which the poor became righteous, and the rich became evil. This, to Nietzsche, was the beginning of “the slave rebellion in morals.” Drawing on astronomy, Nietzsche then reminds the reader how much psychology depends on inference to understand processes we cannot directly observe.
Nietzsche continues to emphasize the importance of unconscious processes in human thinking, arguing that no true insight is possible without considering how unconscious drives influence our conscious insights. Included in this category is the unconscious desire to possess—itself an expression of the will to power—which motivates even the purest forms of love. Nietzsche then states explicitly that the Judeo-Christian tradition is the source of modern morality, as it inverted traditional hierarchies of both society and virtues to create a new understanding of good and evil—one which has survived to this day.
Themes
Proposing a hypothetical chapter on “Morality as Timidity,” Nietzsche wonders why moralists are so distressed by the tropics and their healthy abundance. This privileging of temperance is similar to moralities of happiness, in which Nietzsche finds merely prudence and elaborate controls for one’s passions. He then argues that the need to obey is innate to humankind, and that this explains much of the tumultuous, unpredictable nature of human development.
Nietzsche’s comment on the tropics refers to a general attitude in 19th-century European thought. This attitude regarded the rich plant and animal life of the tropics—and often included non-European peoples in the animal category—as aberrant and indeed dangerous; this attitude would form the basis of eugenics. Noting the racism Protestant ethic of temperance that motivates such a worldview, Nietzsche finds this morality particular shallow and fragile in its hypocrisy.
Themes
The problem in modern Europe stems from refusal of those who command to truly take up their roles. Equally influenced by the “herd instinct,” they deceive themselves and pretend to be one with the herd. The herd man, conversely, is held up as a moral good in his own right. The falseness of this doctrine of equality is proven by the case of Napoleon; when someone ready to command appears, the herd is not only willing but happy to obey.
Firmly believing that humans are naturally inclined to command and obey—not live as equals—Nietzsche finds the abdication of “nobles” in modern Europe to be deeply disheartening. The example of Napoleon, who seized power at the end of the radically democratic French Revolution, shows how thin the veneer of egalitarianism is, illustrating eagerness with which the democratic movement embraces an authoritarian ruler to relieve it of responsibility.
Themes
Nietzsche believes that modernity is an “age of disintegration” in which races are mixed “indiscriminately,” leading to contradictory feelings and desires within individuals. These impure individuals are not only weaker but seek rest above all else, a relief from their own incongruous nature. On the other hand, some individuals of this type are made even stronger by the need to constantly master the irreconcilable aspect of their being; among them Nietzsche counts Caesar and Leonardo da Vinci.
Nietzsche fails to clearly define his understanding of race and class, and he often uses race and class interchangeably, like in this passage. Class, for Nietzsche, corresponds to caste status, the division of the noble and the common. The weakness that results from their mixing is the same as the weakness that results from the mixing of races. This appears to contradict Nietzsche’s later criticisms of nationalism and “fatherlandishness,” however.
Themes
As morality is conditioned by the community in which it exists—the herd—immorality includes all that is perceived as dangerous to the community. This, Nietzsche argues, makes a morality of “neighbor love” impossible. Rather, “neighbor love” is an imagined alternative to a real fear of the neighbor. Certain behaviors, when no longer useful to society, are branded as immoral and suppressed, and their opposites are valued instead. Fear is the source of morality, leading to the ostracization of all who are different in a community. Even worse, to Nietzsche, is the way this morality ultimately seeks to abolish itself, refusing to punish—and inspire fear in—those who threaten it.
Nietzsche articulates here the reasoning behind his assertion that fear—not love—drives morality. As morality, like religion, is (or should be) an instrument a community uses to defend itself, it is poised against potential threats. Both the development of morality into an end rather than a means, however, and the lack of external threats to the broadly construed community of modern, Christian Europe lead this fear to turn inward, initiating a self-destructive cycle powered by fear disguised as love.
Themes
Nietzsche, while aware of the insulting nature of his comparing morality to the herd instinct, insists that it is the most appropriate description. European morality now believes that it knows good and evil, and while it is but one kind of morality, as a herd morality it denies the possibility of such other moralities. Enabled by Christianity, the “democratic movement” has become the supreme expression of the herd instinct. This mentality, to Nietzsche, includes both democrats and revolutionaries alike, despite their differences. Sharing a faith in pity, the adherents of this herd mentality ultimately believe only in themselves.
For Nietzsche, it is precisely the triumph of European morality that has made it so dangerously self-destructive. Because this morality has become so widespread, even those who imagine themselves to be totally opposed to society have merely reproduced society, beginning a cycle of destruction without the potential to create a genuinely, new, alternative system of morality. Nietzsche’s characterization of conservatives, democrats, and revolutionaries as all sharing the same basic herd instinct was a radically unorthodox position for the time, in which the opposition of those parties seemed to be absolute.
Themes
Nietzsche and the philosophers of the future, in contrast, believe not in the herd but in strong individuals, in the future of humankind as the future of the will. To achieve such a future will require both creating and exploiting its conditions, forcing the soul to find eternal values once again, an endeavor which is fraught with the risk that the leaders it hopes to create will fail to appear. Nietzsche sees both the great potential that still remains in humankind and the dangerous degeneration it is undergoing, an understanding that leaves him with both a great burden and a mission.
Nietzsche refers once more to the eternal return, arguing that the philosophers of the future must look inward. Opposing modern society is not enough, as many of its critics have merely replicated it in their own ideas. Nietzsche balances his pessimistic predictions with hopeful enthusiasm, anticipating that the self-destructive nature of modern society will also create opportunities to find the eternal values he aspires to once again. Nevertheless, his anxiety that this mission will fail strikes a sharp contrast to many of his contemporaries of all political persuasions, who largely shared an unshakeable faith in their visions of the future.
Themes
