Half the Sky

Is Islam Misogynistic? The chapter opens with an anecdote about Kristof’s interpreter in Afghanistan, who appeared very modern until he said his mother will never visit a doctor because Afghanistan has no women doctors, and for her to visit a male one would be against Islam, even if she were dying. The authors report that, of countries where female genital cutting and honor killings are common, many are mostly Muslim. While Latin countries are known for machismo cultures, girls are more likely to be educated and cared for than in predominantly Muslim countries, where polls show some people “just don't believe in equality.” For instance, “more than 34 percent of Moroccans approve of polygamy.” The authors argue that these attitudes have far more to do with culture than with the Koran, but they acknowledge that this claim is complicated by the fact that Muslims who do oppress women often cite the Koran as justification. The authors ask the frank question, “Is Islam misogynistic?”

They begin with the history-informed answer, no. When Muhammad introduced Islam to the world, the authors write, Islam served women by limiting polygamy and banning female infanticide. Some Muslim women even owned property, which was more rare in Europe. Further, early Christian regard for women was often clearly misogynistic. The main difference is that Christianity has progressed more over the centuries than Islam. For example, in 2002 when a Saudi Arabia school caught fire, the police allegedly forced girls back into the fire rather than let them leave without body coverings. Plus, pious Muslims today are more likely to follow the codes of gender discrimination endorsed in the Koran than Christians and Jews are to follow corollary, obsolete codes in the Bible.

However, the authors stress, many Muslim are fighting for gender equality. For example, some Islamic scholars refute Koranic verse translations that suggest beating women is permissible. Islamic feminists also argue that, “it is absurd for Saudi Arabia to bar women from driving, because Muhammad allowed his wives to drive camels.” Kristof and WuDunn use the complicated example of slavery as an analogy: Islamic law approves of slavery but also encourages freeing slaves, and though some Muslim governments abolished slavery only in recent decades, the institution is now officially banned in the Islamic world. The authors argue that, as with slavery, Islam can embrace women’s emancipation, too. They bring in the historical example of Aisha, one of Muhammad’s wives, who was falsely accused of adultery and defended by Muhammad. After Muhammad died, Aisha vocally refuted misogynistic views in Islam, and even led an armed rebellion (by camel) against a male caliph. Recently, Islamic scholars have resurrected Aisha’s work to reshape interpretations of the Koran.

The authors describe a time when Kristof “quizzed” female Saudi medical staff about their views on women’s rights. They resented the questions, demanding, “Why does it matter so much what we wear? Of all the issues in the world, is that really so important?” One woman explained that, when they are alone, women complain about Islamic rules, but don’t want anyone fighting on their behalf, which patronizes them. The authors argue that, “Westerners often miss the complexity of gender roles in the Islamic world.” Paradoxes abound in countries like Iran, where the vice president may be a woman but women need the consent of their husbands to travel abroad. Further, views on gender equality are quickly evolving in the Middle East, the authors write, among both men and women. They cite Soraya Salti as a leader in promoting entrepreneurship in Arab countries. A Jordanian, Soraya founded the program Injaz to teach business skills to 100,000 children a year, offering girls an alternate career path from the restrictive male-dominated workforce.

Kristof and WuDunn describe the Women’s Detention Center in Afghanistan, where “inmates include teenage girls and young women who were suspected of having a boyfriend and then subjected to a ‘virginity test—a hymen inspection.” The director, a woman named Rana, has both been empowered to build a career, and thinks that girls who have lost hymens deserve punishment. Ellaha is one young inmate for whom being in jail is safer than being free. When Ellaha found work at an American construction company in Afghanistan, a supportive boss arranged a scholarship for her in Canada. Her family resisted, wanting her to marry her cousin, but Ellaha refused, which inspired her younger sister to refuse an arranged marriage also. So in retaliation the family beat them both for days, chaining their wrists and ankles, until they agreed to marry their cousins. Eventually, Ellaha and her sister ran away and were arrested, subjected to a hymen inspection, which they passed, then jailed by Rana for their own protection.

The authors write that among the many reasons for Islamic extremism and terrorism is “the broader marginalization of women.” Societies with more men than women, like many Muslim societies, tend to have more violence, the authors report, especially when the male population is younger, as they are in Muslim countries. Some men are raised in an environment “with the ethos of a high school boys’ locker room,” they write, which can cultivate violence. Further, countries with more women’s oppression tend to also have economic problems that foment unrest, since economies are held back when women remain an untapped economic resource. The authors quote a UN report as saying, “The rise of women is in fact a prerequisite for an Arab renaissance.” Bill Gates made a similar claim to a conference in Saudi Arabia, about technology’s dim future there without the employment of women’s minds. Kristof and WuDunn also suggest that patriarchal homes inform governments to be more patriarchal.

The Afghan Insurgent. The authors begin by writing that, “Western aid efforts have been particularly ineffective in Muslim countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan.” An influx of well-intentioned American volunteers arrived in Kabul in 2001, they write, buying SUVs and cornflakes, but seldom working in the countryside where they would have been more helpful. What’s more, some gestures were received as shameful, such as giving free soap to women—in Afghanistan, soap is associated with washing after sex, making the gesture deeply offensive. Some groups, the authors report, have been successful, but true success would require Westerners to recede and local citizens to engage. Perhaps most important is to gain the support of the local mullahs (religious leaders), even if that means making concessions in school curricula.

The authors give the example of Sakena Yacoobi as a leader in successful aid efforts in Afghanistan. An Afghan Muslim herself, she founded the Afghan Institute of Learning, which the authors argue American aid groups would have done well to donate to instead of dispatching their own volunteers to Kabul. After earning two degrees in the U.S., Sakena opened a girls’ school in Peshawar, which had 15,000 students by the second year. The Taliban outlawed female education, so, incredibly, all eighty schools were secret, and only one was raided, luckily with enough time to turn the classroom back into a living room. After the Taliban fell, Sakena was able to extend her services to 350,000 people, including a university for women and workshops on legal rights. There are even religious lessons that teach women how to cite the Koran to defend their rights to their husbands. Sakena also runs health clinics and teaches vocational skills so women can earn money.

The authors describe Sakena as, “one of the great social entrepreneurs of Afghanistan...and constantly in danger,” receiving daily death threats and changing bodyguards frequently. Although Sakena is a pious Muslim, some fundamentalists wish her dead. At the end of the chapter, Sakena is quoted as imploring the international community to channel funds not toward weapons but rather toward education, calling it the only way to defeat terrorism.