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Chapter 3
Themes
Key
LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in Merchants of Doubt, which you can use to track the themes throughout the work.
Science, Trust, and Public Policy
Capitalism and the Environment
Media Bias
Certainty, Doubt, and the Scientific Method
Summary
Analysis
In 1970, scientists found that new supersonic planes (SSTs) would emit so much water vapor that they could deplete Earth’s ozone layer and substantially increase skin cancer rates. At a major conference, the atmospheric chemist Harold Johnston showed that the nitrogen oxide compounds SSTs released would damage the ozone layer even more. A draft of Johnston’s passionate paper on the subject leaked to the press and caused a public uproar.
Just like acid rain, ozone depletion presents a serious, potentially irreversible risk to a large portion of the population and environment. In both cases, it’s possible to stop the emissions responsible for the danger, and the only people who stand to suffer from these emissions restrictions are the wealthy executives who run polluting companies. As a result, it's little surprise that the merchants of doubt got involved in both issues—on behalf of the polluters.
Themes
After cancelling the SST program due to its cost, the U.S. government still funded a climate assessment report on it. The report found that SSTs would significantly deplete the ozone layer, but oddly, its executive summary simply argued that better SSTs in the future wouldn’t pose any ozone-related risks. Major newspapers started attacking scientists like Harold Johnston, but they refused to publish letters defending their research and correcting the executive summary. Johnston published his rebuttal in the journal Science, but it never received public attention. SST airplanes never became common, but Johnston’s research led to a wave of studies about how industrial chemicals like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) destroy ozone. Congress recognized the danger and immediately started holding hearings about CFCs.
Years before the acid rain debate, government officials were already manipulating scientific reports to play down the dangers of pollution. This approach was the same as Fred Singer’s appendix to the Nierenberg report: the SST report placed blind faith in future technology, which it claimed would solve environmental problems on its own. And the media repeated the same troubling pattern: leading publications treated pollution as a political issue, not a scientific one. They sidelined legitimate scientific research, while amplifying doubt-mongers’ voices instead. Yet despite all these obstacles, the government still worked as intended: it began investigating how to build policies around the best available science for the sake of the public interest.
Themes
The Ozone War. Oreskes and Conway describe how aerosol manufacturers conducted their own research on CFCs and funded public relations campaigns to defend them. A U.S. government task force recommended banning CFCs, and it assigned the National Academy of Sciences to review the evidence. In response, the aerosol industry paid a British professor to tour the U.S., denouncing this research. Reporters publicly discredited him. So, the industry changed tactics: it started blaming volcanos for high atmospheric CFC levels. However, a major eruption quickly disproved this hypothesis.
Themes
Next, a young researcher proved that CFCs were breaking down the ozone layer by discovering chlorine monoxide in the stratosphere. Chlorine monoxide is a “fingerprint” for ozone depletion: it is only produced when chlorine breaks down ozone. However, when the NAS delayed its final report on ozone to make revisions—new data suggested that ozone breakdown could be slower than previously thought—the aerosol lobby triumphantly told the public that CFCs were totally safe. Yet the final NAS report indicated that CFCs were quickly destroying the ozone later. The NAS suggested completely banning CFCs within two years. Regulators started formulating new rules, and the public started dramatically reducing CFC use on its own.
Themes
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Holes in the Ozone Layer. Oreskes and Conway explain how, in the 1980s, British researchers discovered a massive hole in the ozone layer above Antarctica. This shocked the scientific establishment, which couldn’t explain the hole and wondered why NASA satellites failed to detect it. They realized that the satellites had mistakenly processed low ozone concentrations as measurement errors. Soon, researchers had clear images of the vast Antarctic ozone hole. Some meteorologists questioned the evidence, but the U.S. sent two groups to Antarctica to investigate further. They discovered that CFCs specifically accelerated ozone breakdown in the Antarctic because of Antarctica’s distinctive strong winds and icy clouds.
Themes
Creating an Adaptive Regulatory Regime. In 1987, at a UN conference in Montreal, nations agreed to reduce global CFC emissions by half and reconvene every few years to adapt their plans as needed. New satellite data soon proved that ozone depletion was worse than predicted—including in the Northern Hemisphere. But scientists also knew that satellite measurements could be very unreliable, so they established the Ozone Trends Panel to review the evidence. The panel concluded that ozone depletion was very severe, even if satellites were overestimating it. A DuPont chemical company scientist who served on the panel even convinced the company’s executives to stop making CFCs.
Themes
An Arctic Ozone Hole? Next, researchers began asking whether there might also be an ozone hole over the Arctic. In 1989, stratospheric scientists made several flights into the Arctic and found even higher levels of chlorine monoxide than in the Antarctic. Yet there was no ozone hole, because the Arctic isn’t as cold or windy as the Antarctic. Still, based on this new research, nations agreed to completely ban CFC production in 1990.
Themes
Constructing a Counternarrative. Oreskes and Conway call the CFC ban “a success story” for science-based environmental regulation. Yet they note that industry, Reagan appointees, and conservative think tanks also consistently tried to derail the regulations through doubt-mongering. One of the leading voices was the Heritage Foundation, a new right-wing think tank funded by banks and large corporations. It gave Fred Singer a prominent platform in the 1980s. By the time of the ozone debate a few years later, Singer was working for the U.S. government instead. But he publicly questioned the research on ozone anyway.
Themes
In an article on the front page of the Wall Street Journal, Fred Singer claimed that ozone wasn’t being depleted, just moving around. He blamed many factors besides ozone depletion for causing more skin cancer, and he seriously mischaracterized the research about SSTs. He suggested that researchers overreacted by panicking about SSTs and were repeating the same mistake. In a paper the following year, Singer argued that natural climate change caused the ozone hole by cooling the stratosphere. He cited researchers like V. Ramanathan and James E. Hansen, who agreed that climate change was cooling the stratosphere—but attributed this to human greenhouse gas emissions, not natural processes. Of course, Singer concluded that no new regulations were necessary.
Themes
When Science rejected Fred Singer’s paper for its lack of rigor, Singer publicly complained in the conservative National Review. He accused the scientific community of selfishness, alarmism, and jumping to conclusions. He falsely claimed that the ozone hole was first discovered in the 1950s, and he warned that CFC substitutes would be ineffective and dangerous—even though they didn’t exist yet. In fact, after CFCs were banned, scientists did develop far safer and more effective alternatives.
After the final CFC ban, most policymakers and scientists moved on to other pressing issues, but Fred Singer stayed focused on ozone. He founded a think tank called the SEPP (Science and Environmental Policy Project), secured funding from a powerful conservative church, and started publishing articles claiming that the consensus on ozone was wrong because it used ground-based measurements instead of satellite data. (Actually, the satellite data showed even more ozone depletion.)
Themes
In 1990, the zoologist and former Washington governor Dixy Lee Ray lent credibility to Singer’s work by citing it in her book, which was an attack on the environmentalist movement. But Singer’s data wasn’t based on original research—instead, it came from a fringe political magazine. It confused stratospheric chlorine, which destroys ozone, with chlorine emissions from sources like volcanos, which never reach the stratosphere. Sherwood Rowland publicly refuted this evidence in a major 1993 speech, but Singer kept repeating it—including at congressional hearings. When Rowland won a Nobel Prize for his work on ozone, Singer accused the committee and the public of “environmental hysteria.” Yet Republican leaders continued listening to Singer, not Rowland.
What Was This Really About? Oreskes and Conway explore Singer’s true motives for spreading doubt about ozone depletion. Even as he accused other scientists of seeking money and fame, his organization, the SEPP, made millions of dollars, and he became one of the most popular scientists in the country. But it wasn’t just about money. In 1989, he argued that socialists were trying to overthrow free-market capitalism by spreading lies about environmental threats. Thus, it’s clear why the Marshall Institute began repeating Singer’s claims and pro-business newspapers eagerly published them.
Themes
