How Democracies Die: Chapter 9 Summary & Analysis

Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that U.S. democracy is heading toward collapse because rising polarization since the 1960s has led to an “epidemic of norm breaking.” They reject the popular idea that democracy is receding across the globe—while many countries’ democracies are declining, just as many are strengthening, and most are perfectly intact. With many exceptions, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has focused on promoting democracy and fighting authoritarianism. But Trump neither promotes democracy nor effectively models it for the world, so he may help democracy decline globally.

Levitsky and Ziblatt envision three different ways that the U.S. can come out of Trump’s presidency. First, if Trump becomes widely unpopular, loses re-election, or gets removed from office, American democracy could quickly bounce back. The Democrats could undo his policies and pass new reforms to strengthen democracy, while the Republicans could give up on their extremism. While this is the best-case scenario, it’s not likely, because polarization was already increasing and norms were already falling apart for decades before Trump’s rise to power.

Second, led by Trump, the Republicans might keep winning elections, consolidate power through constitutional hardball, and implement a white nationalist agenda that keeps the U.S. electorate majority white. The Trump administration is already contemplating this agenda, which would be “profoundly antidemocratic” and probably lead to significant resistance—or even widespread violence and police repression. This scenario is also unlikely, but it’s possible—in countries like Lebanon and Israel, declining majorities have used war and oppression to keep power. Of course, white supremacists governed the Southern U.S. in the same way for almost a century.

Third and most likely, the U.S. might end up in a polarized system of “democracy without solid guardrails.” Levitsky and Ziblatt point to North Carolina as an example of how this would look. It’s a relatively wealthy, diverse, politically split state. It has become a partisan battleground, with state politics polarized over issues like abortion, Medicaid, and transgender people’s rights in public bathrooms.

In 2010, North Carolina’s Republican-controlled state legislature gerrymandered electoral districts to ensure that it maintained a large majority. In 2012, Republicans won nine of the state’s thirteen congressional seats, despite receiving a minority of the vote. State Republican legislators collected demographic data on voters, then passed a series of new voting restrictions to exclusively target Black voters. When the courts ordered them to freeze the laws, they ignored the courts. And when a Democrat won the governorship, they considered overturning the election and passed a series of laws to limit the governor’s power instead. With Republicans increasingly willing to grab and consolidate power by any means necessary, the nation may soon look like North Carolina.

Levitsky and Ziblatt return to one of their book’s key lessons: in the U.S., democracy has depended on the key norms of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. The founders thought that well-designed institutions would be enough to stop tyranny, but they were wrong. To function, institutions need informal, shared rules—or norms. Americans recognize freedom and equality as key national values, but they should view toleration and forbearance the same way.

Many progressive Americans believe that the Democrats should “fight like Republicans” in order to win—they think that the Democrats will lose if they play by the rules while the Republicans ignore them. To stop Donald Trump, some Democrats proposed obstructing all Republican legislation, challenging the 2016 election results, or launching impeachment proceedings right away.

Levitsky and Ziblatt reject these ideas. If the Democrats play dirty, they argue, moderates will abandon them and Republicans will unite to crack down on them. When Hugo Chávez’s opponents tried to oust him through a coup, general strike, and election boycott, they actually destroyed their own credibility and gave Chávez a justification for persecuting them. In contrast, in Colombia, democratic forces prevented Álvaro Uribe from running for a third term by focusing on winning over the legislature and judiciary. If the Democrats push Trump out through hardball, the government they inherit will lack democratic norms. Partisanship and polarization would only increase.

Instead of copying Republican tactics, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the Democrats should focus on reinforcing democratic norms and winning back power through institutions. When they protest, they should strive to support democratic rights and institutions, not challenge them. While it’s important for Democrats to build progressive coalitions with diverse groups, it’s even more important for them to build pro-democracy coalitions with conservative adversaries, like evangelical leaders and corporate executives. Such coalitions can appeal to a broader range of voters, fight polarization, and build mutual toleration.

In fact, Trump’s abuses of power aren’t “the fundamental problem facing American democracy”—partisan polarization is. Politicians can lead the people to unity by first building alliances among themselves. Chilean politicians did this during the Pinochet dictatorship. Although they were enemies during the period of escalating tensions that killed Chilean democracy, the Socialists and conservative Christian Democrats worked together to defeat the dictatorship and reinstate democracy. For decades thereafter, they continued to consult with one another—and even their pro-Pinochet opponents—on all new legislation. However, Levitsky and Ziblatt doubt that this strategy would work in the U.S.

Rather than waiting for politicians to cooperate despite polarization, the U.S. has to defeat polarization. Political scientists have proposed many policy remedies, but Levitsky and Ziblatt think that it would be more effective to address racial, religious, and economic forces in American society. The Republican Party’s extreme tactics and ideological shift have primarily driven this polarization. In particular, conservative media and wealthy donors have driven this shift. They have more power over Republican politicians than the party leadership does. So Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the party needs to be reformed. Leadership must retake control of the party’s “finance, grassroots organization, messaging, and candidate selection.” They should make the party more diverse and expel extremists.

Refounding the Republican Party sounds extremely difficult, but in the past, conservative parties have successfully rebuilt democracies by rebuilding themselves. For instance, before the end of World War II, Germany’s conservative parties were always either extremist or disorganized. But after the war, anti-Nazi conservatives founded the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a tolerant center-right party that embraced both Catholics and Protestants. Like the CDU, the Republican Party can choose democracy over extremism and appeal to more voters besides white Christians. However, the CDU only rebuilt itself in response to a catastrophe, and the authors ask if the Republican Party will be able to do the same without a profound crisis.

The Democrats can also help decrease polarization by focusing less attention on ethnic minority voters. But Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that “this is a terrible idea.” From its founding until the 1960s, the U.S. political system was based on antidemocratic racial exclusion. Instead of repeating its mistakes, it should strive to create an equitable multiethnic democracy.

Levitsky and Ziblatt propose that Democrats should fight polarization by addressing the nation’s growing economic inequality (which has fueled the social resentment that underlies partisan polarization). Instead of using means-tested programs that only give benefits to certain people, the Democrats should implement universal social policies that can appeal to voters across the partisan spectrum. Examples of such programs include universal healthcare, a higher minimum wage, a universal basic income, paid parental leave, daycare, better job training, and work-study programs. Passing these programs will be difficult, but American democracy depends on them.

Levitsky and Ziblatt conclude that the U.S.’s situation is similar to other countries’ democratic crises throughout history. American democracy depends on U.S. citizens’ ability to restore basic norms and extend them across racial and ethnic lines.