Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, political scientists at Harvard who are experts on authoritarianism, wrote How Democracies Die in the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency to answer a fundamental question about 21st century American politics: “Is our democracy in danger?” They answered yes. While the U.S.’s democratic institutions were still intact, the nation faced a unique and unprecedented threat from Donald Trump’s extreme, intolerant, anti-democratic style of politics. With its democratic norms and guardrails already weakened, the U.S. was beginning to look remarkably similar to other democracies on the brink of collapse—like Chile in the 1970s, Venezuela in the 1990s, or even Germany in the 1930s. And Trump threatened to push it over the edge. The authors argue that Donald Trump’s “clear authoritarian tendencies” posed a clear and present danger to U.S. democracy, and it was up to Americans—voters as well as politicians—to stop him.
During the 2016 election process, Donald Trump displayed all four of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s main warning signs of authoritarianism, signaling that he posed a threat to American democracy. First, Trump rejected the basic rules of democracy—most importantly, he questioned the free and fair electoral system by making up claims of voter fraud. Elections are the cornerstone of democracy because they make the government reflect the people’s will. By rejecting them, Trump encouraged Americans to hand him power through anti-democratic means. Second, Trump denied his opponents’ legitimacy—for instance, he argued that Barack Obama wasn’t born in the U.S. and called for Hillary Clinton to be locked up in prison. He thereby positioned himself as the only legitimate candidate, an idea that he could have used to justify rejecting the election results. Third, Trump supported violence among his followers (most notably at his campaign rallies). This was troubling because democracy relies on the peaceful transfer of power to the winner of legitimate elections. Fourth and finally, Trump publicly supported restricting his critics’ civil liberties. For instance, he called for censoring and prosecuting the press. But critics and the media hold leaders accountable for their actions—by attacking them, Trump tried to avoid this public accountability. Levitsky and Ziblatt note that Trump is the only “major presidential candidate in modern U.S. history” to meet more than one of these four criteria. This is why, in their view, he poses a unique threat to democracy in the U.S.
Sure enough, once he entered office, Donald Trump acted like an authoritarian: he tried to consolidate power and dismantle democracy through three classic authoritarian strategies. First, he tried to “capture the referees”—or turn neutral agencies into partisan weapons. For instance, he asked for personal favors from FBI director James Comey and attacked the Office of Government Ethics. Instead of letting neutral agencies perform formal oversight, which would prevent him from abusing his power, Trump wanted to use their oversight power against his opponents. That was his second authoritarian tendency: he tried to “sideline the opposition” through the law. For instance, he tried to file legal cases against unfavorable journalists, Democratic politicians, and “sanctuary cities.” By eliminating their critics and rivals for power, authoritarians increase their own chances of maintaining power. Third and finally, Trump tried “to tilt the playing field,” or change laws to help him stay in power. Most importantly, he pushed for states to pass voting restrictions targeting Democratic voters. He hoped that this legislation would bias elections in his favor. In Levitsky and Ziblatt’s analysis, Trump’s behavior in office showed that he cared more about maintaining power than preserving democracy.
While Trump clearly attempted to dismantle American democracy, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, American voters and politicians determined whether he would succeed. First, Republican gatekeepers had the power to stop Trump, both during the election and once he took office. They could have more forcefully rejected his demagogic tendencies, endorsed Hillary Clinton in the election, or voted against his anti-democratic policies. However, they failed: instead, they tolerated, normalized, and eventually supported him. Next, the Democrats could also stop the U.S.’s slide into authoritarianism by building nationwide support for democracy and democratic norms. Even if Trump didn’t win reelection, the authors argue, he would leave a dangerous legacy of broken democratic norms and distrust in democracy. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the Democrats should focus on repairing this legacy by winning back power through institutions, addressing economic inequality, and clearly articulating the value of democratic norms like mutual toleration and institutional forbearance to voters. Finally, the public could also block Trump’s authoritarian agenda by turning against him. When public opinion favors authoritarian leaders, Levitsky and Ziblatt note, opponents soften their criticism and the leaders become emboldened. But by mounting a consistent campaign of public opposition, citizens could make each step in Trump’s agenda harder to achieve. Writing in the first year of Trump’s presidency, Levitsky and Ziblatt note that his earliest attempts to dismantle democracy were largely unsuccessful. But this didn’t make them any less dangerous—after all, many democracies collapse piecemeal, over the course of years. Levitsky and Ziblatt conclude that Americans ought to firmly and consistently oppose Trump’s agenda for as long as he continues to threaten democracy.
In their final chapter, the authors look at three different possible outcomes for Donald Trump’s presidency. First, the nation might bounce back and recommit to building a diverse, inclusive democracy. Second, the Republican Party might seize perpetual control of the U.S. government and pursue a white nationalist agenda, attacking minority groups and immigrants in an effort to keep the U.S. majority white and Protestant. Finally, democratic norms might continue to fade, and the nation might keep growing more polarized and extreme. The choice is up to Americans themselves. Since Levitsky and Ziblatt published this book in 2018, Trump’s term in office has ended and Americans can decide for themselves how he has affected democratic norms, institutions, and attitudes in the United States.
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American Tyranny Quotes in How Democracies Die
Is our democracy in danger? It is a question we never thought we’d be asking. We have been colleagues for fifteen years, thinking, writing, and teaching students about failures of democracy in other places and times—Europe’s dark 1930s, Latin America’s repressive 1970s. We have spent years researching new forms of authoritarianism emerging around the globe. For us, how and why democracies die has been an occupational obsession.
But now we find ourselves turning to our own country. Over the past two years, we have watched politicians say and do things that are unprecedented in the United States—but that we recognize as having been the precursors of democratic crisis in other places. We feel dread, as do so many other Americans, even as we try to reassure ourselves that things can’t really be that bad here. After all, even though we know democracies are always fragile, the one in which we live has somehow managed to defy gravity.
Blatant dictatorship—in the form of fascism, communism, or military rule—has disappeared across much of the world. Military coups and other violent seizures of power are rare. Most countries hold regular elections. Democracies still die, but by different means. Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected governments themselves. Like Chávez in Venezuela, elected leaders have subverted democratic institutions in Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine. Democratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box.
A cast of political outsiders, including Adolf Hitler, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, came to power on the same path: from the inside, via elections or alliances with powerful political figures. In each instance, elites believed the invitation to power would contain the outsider, leading to a restoration of control by mainstream politicians. But their plans backfired. A lethal mix of ambition, fear, and miscalculation conspired to lead them to the same fateful mistake: willingly handing over the keys of power to an autocrat-in-the-making.
Building on Linz’s work, we have developed a set of four behavioral warning signs that can help us know an authoritarian when we see one. We should worry when a politician 1) rejects, in words or action, the democratic rules of the game, 2) denies the legitimacy of opponents, 3) tolerates or encourages violence, or 4) indicates a willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents, including the media. Table 1 shows how to assess politicians in terms of these four factors.
In short, Americans have long had an authoritarian streak. It was not unusual for figures such as Coughlin, Long, McCarthy, and Wallace to gain the support of a sizable minority—30 or even 40 percent—of the country. We often tell ourselves that America’s national political culture in some way immunizes us from such appeals, but this requires reading history with rose-colored glasses. The real protection against would-be authoritarians has not been Americans’ firm commitment to democracy but, rather, the gatekeepers—our political parties.
Collective abdication—the transfer of authority to a leader who threatens democracy—usually flows from one of two sources. The first is the misguided belief that an authoritarian can be controlled or tamed. The second is what sociologist Ivan Ermakoff calls “ideological collusion,” in which the authoritarian’s agenda overlaps sufficiently with that of mainstream politicians that abdication is desirable, or at least preferable to the alternatives. But when faced with a would-be authoritarian, establishment politicians must unambiguously reject him or her and do everything possible to defend democratic institutions—even if that means temporarily joining forces with bitter rivals.
The traditions underpinning America’s democratic institutions are unraveling, opening up a disconcerting gap between how our political system works and long-standing expectations about how it ought to work. As our soft guardrails have weakened, we have grown increasingly vulnerable to antidemocratic leaders.
Donald Trump, a serial norm breaker, is widely (and correctly) criticized for assaulting America’s democratic norms. But the problem did not begin with Trump. The process of norm erosion started decades ago—long before Trump descended an escalator to announce his presidential candidacy.
Efforts to discourage voting are fundamentally antidemocratic, and they have a particularly deplorable history in the United States. Although contemporary voter-restriction efforts are nowhere near as far-reaching as those undertaken by southern Democrats in the late nineteenth century, they are nevertheless significant. Because strict voter ID laws disproportionately affect low-income minority voters, who are overwhelmingly Democratic, they skew elections in favor of the GOP.
In many ways, President Trump followed the electoral authoritarian script during his first year. He made efforts to capture the referees, sideline the key players who might halt him, and tilt the playing field. But the president has talked more than he has acted, and his most notorious threats have not been realized. […] President Trump repeatedly scraped up against the guardrails, like a reckless driver, but he did not break through them. Despite clear causes for concern, little actual backsliding occurred in 2017. We did not cross the line into authoritarianism.
It is still early, however. The backsliding of democracy is often gradual, its effects unfolding slowly over time. Comparing Trump’s first year in office to those of other would-be authoritarians, the picture is mixed.
We fear that if Trump were to confront a war or terrorist attack, he would exploit this crisis fully—using it to attack political opponents and restrict freedoms Americans take for granted. In our view, this scenario represents the greatest danger facing American democracy today.
Norms are the soft guardrails of democracy; as they break down, the zone of acceptable political behavior expands, giving rise to discourse and action that could imperil democracy. Behavior that was once considered unthinkable in American politics is becoming thinkable. Even if Donald Trump does not break the hard guardrails of our constitutional democracy, he has increased the likelihood that a future president will.
A second, much darker future is one in which President Trump and the Republicans continue to win with a white nationalist appeal. Under this scenario, a pro-Trump GOP would retain the presidency, both houses of Congress, and the vast majority of statehouses, and it would eventually gain a solid majority in the Supreme Court. It would then use the techniques of constitutional hardball to manufacture durable white electoral majorities. This could be done through a combination of large-scale deportation, immigration restrictions, the purging of voter rolls, and the adoption of strict voter ID laws. Measures to reengineer the electorate would likely be accompanied by elimination of the filibuster and other rules that protect Senate minorities, so that Republicans could impose their agenda even with narrow majorities. These measures may appear extreme, but every one of them has been at least contemplated by the Trump administration.
The third, and in our view, most likely, post-Trump future is one marked by polarization, more departures from unwritten political conventions, and increasing institutional warfare—in other words, democracy without solid guardrails.
Opposition to the Trump administration’s authoritarian behavior should be muscular, but it should seek to preserve, rather than violate, democratic rules and norms. Where possible, opposition should center on Congress, the courts, and, of course, elections. If Trump is defeated via democratic institutions, it will strengthen those institutions.
Reducing polarization requires that the Republican Party be reformed, if not refounded outright. First of all, the GOP must rebuild its own establishment. This means regaining leadership control in four key areas: finance, grassroots organization, messaging, and candidate selection. Only if the party leadership can free itself from the clutches of outside donors and right-wing media can it go about transforming itself. This entails major changes: Republicans must marginalize extremist elements; they must build a more diverse electoral constituency, such that the party no longer depends so heavily on its shrinking white Christian base; and they must find ways to win elections without appealing to white nationalism, or what Republican Arizona senator Jeff Flake calls the “sugar high of populism, nativism, and demagoguery.”
